The UN's Monitor Report: Fighting Al Qaeda and Islamic State in Africa
North Africa
In the north of the continent, both terror groups were found to be at their weakest. In the past few years, major affiliate organisations in North Africa have been hit hard. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has moved into northern Mali. Islamic State affiliate, Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia (JAK-T) is facing major financing issues. Following the deaths of many of its prominent members, JAK-T is believed to be hiding in the Samama Mountains in Tunisia. There are believed to be only fifteen members left of this group.
In Morocco, there has been immense success in fighting these terror organisations. Counter-terror authorities have shut down five terrorist cells that were working with the Core Islamic State organisation or its affiliate in the Great Sahara (ISGS). In total, twenty-five people were arrested, with one cell having plans to rob banks across Morocco to fund IS terror operations.
In Libya, the fight against Islamic State has been frought with difficulty due to the affiliate's connections to organised crime. The affiliate, Islamic State in the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya), has close links to organised crime groups that control trafficking routes in the country. The report also suggests that ISIL-Libya are attempting to infiltrate local tribes to aid in recruitment, especially in the south of the country. One of the scariest things revealed by the report is that ISIL-Libya is focusing its efforts on recruiting chemists and scientists in hopes of committing more sophisticated attacks. The group has around three hundred to five hundred members and is currently based in southern Libya, where they are free from Government intervention. The Government in Libya is still unstable and does not have full control over the entire country. The south, and some central regions, are absent from any Government or authority. Their close relationships with organised criminals have allowed them to reorganise themselves in the Fezzan Province. The UN Report also indicates that ISIL-Libya may have training camps in Fezzan, where they train fighters going to West Africa and the Sahel.
Despite the reorganisation of the group, Libyan authorities have dismantled several terror cells. Most notably, an engineer was arrested when he was attempting to sabotage gas pipelines using armed drones. More concerning, was the handbook retrieved whilst arresting the engineer. The book contained instructions on how to create poison and biological weapons. It is believed these plans come directly from the ISIL Core.
Intelligence gathering against the group has been diligent and thorough, with the structure of the organisation being known. ISIL-Libya is believed to be divided into four sub-groups each specialising in different areas of terror operation. The sub-groups consist of a bombmaking team, a security team, fighters and a military commission.
Al Qaeda has also entrenched itself in southern Libya. Much like the Islamic State in the south, Al Qaeda uses its position in southern Libya to support its affiliates in the Sahel. The report also indicates that ISIL-Libya and Al-Qaeda in southern Libya collaborate and share resources. Al Qaeda has a much smaller force of only one hundred and fifty to three hundred fighters in southern Libya. Most of these fighters are moving through the area to countries like Niger, Mali and Sudan. It is also believed that these operations are aided by the Tuareg, a semi-nomadic, ethnic group in southern Libya. Intelligence also suggests that Libyan terror groups are using the instability in Sudan to transport fighters to and from West Africa.
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Libyan Counter-terror Forces |
In Egypt, the Al Qaeda-aligned group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) have been nearly destroyed by counter-terror forces. According to the UN Report, local and core structures of the terror organisation have been largely disbanded. The last major attack by the group occurred in December 2022 and is viewed as an act of desperation, with the group's total members estimated to be in the tens or low hundreds. The group's activities in the Sinai Peninsula have been heavily affected by Egypt's investment in local infrastructure and community outreach. Where local communities once acted as potential recruitment sites for the group, now they are aligned with Egypt's Government.
West Africa
In West Africa, affiliate groups play an instrumental role in creating instability. As it becomes more difficult to communicate with the faltering core groups, local affiliates' autonomy is the biggest terror threat in West Africa. One group in particular, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-muslimin (JNIM), currently poses the biggest threat to West African nations. Previously, the group were contained in Mali, but now it seems they have ramped up operations in Burkina Faso. It's believed the increase in operations is being done to apply pressure on local authorities during negotiations. With the escalation of the group's tactics, it seems the once Al Qaeda-affiliated group is now distancing itself from the core organisation. Not only is it straying from Al-Qaeda's core doctrine, but also separating itself from local affiliated groups. In battle, JNIM do not fight under the Al Qaeda flag, but under their own banner. JINM's new terror campaign in Burkina Faso has brought with it many issues for the group. Since JNIM encompasses a number of local fighters, usually beliefs and agendas conflict with one another creating tension within the organisation.
Despite expanding as an organisation, it seems as if JNIM can not compete with the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (ISGS), the IS affiliate in West Africa. The Tri-Border area between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali has become a warring ground for terror organisations. JNIM has suffered major losses at the hands of ISGS, despite fighting alongside Tuareg Militias in the area. It is important to note that these losses for JNIM in border areas do not reflect the group's control further West. Intelligence suggests that Mali's capital is encircled by JNIM, allowing them full control of the entire area up to the southern border. Through local battalions, JNIM can control local political and security disputes. Mali's weak military is also unable to properly fight back against the terror group. The report also implies that the expanded presence of the Wagner Group has done little to combat the influence of JNIM. From these controlled positions in Mali, JNIM can effectively launch attacks in Burkina Faso and the southern Sahel.
The strongest of these JNIM battalions is the Katiba Macina, a force which acts almost autonomously from the rest of the JNIM organisation. The Katiba Macina are most active in Burkina Faso, where the force takes advantage of the instability created by locals, making it hard to distinguish between JNIM advances or just community clashes. They also work closely with the rebel group Ansarul Islam. With their most powerful battalion in Burkina Faso, JNIM has a commanding presence over authorities. JNIM's desire to expand to the southern border of Burkina Faso has also created spillover terrorism in regions of Benin, Togo and Niger.
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JNIM Fighters in the Sahel |
Unlike Al Qaeda affiliates, ISGS remain dedicated to the Core organisation of the Islamic State. The IS affiliate has had some major setbacks with leading members being killed by International forces and by the JNIM. The leadership of ISGS is primarily Arab, with some Fulani deputies. Most of the affiliate's fighters are of Fulani descent. The report believes that this creates a huge potential for infighting and internal descension within the affiliate group. The predominantly Fulani fighting force of ISGS has inadvertently restricted the group's expansion. Many of the Fulani fighters of ISGS do not want to participate in fratricide, as most of the Katiba Macina are also of Fulani descent. This and the fact that ISGS fighters are stretched thin across multiple fronts make the affiliate's advances a lot slower than first expected. Niger seems to be ISGS' new prime target, with multiple attacks taking place across northern regions of the country. These attacks aim to strengthen their supply and recruitment routes from Nigeria.