A Year in Counter Terrorism: The Coups of Africa

The past few years have seen multiple crises in the continent of Africa, not only through the rise in violent extremism but also through political unrest. The coups in Africa have been some of the most reported incidents in Africa this year. Niger and Gabon saw coups this year, making it seven coups in Africa since 2020. Often referred to as the 'coup belt', the worrying trend in Western and Central African coups reveals a worrying trend in African Democracy. The circumstances behind the Nigerien and Gabonese coups reveal the problems with Democracy in these African nations. 

The Nigerien Coup Crisis

The coup in Niger is a showcase of the wider problems in West Africa. To understand why President Mohamed Bazoum was removed from power, it is important to understand the issues surrounding violent extremism in the region. Extremism and insurgency in West Africa are rife. Terrorist organizations and their activities affect the democratic processes both nationally and internationally. Pressures applied to governments by these groups have led to widespread disdain for national governments and their failures when it comes to tackling extremism. This is one reason why coups in West Africa are an extremely common occurrence. Military juntas currently control Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Guinea, and Chad. An overthrow of the government is detrimental to the international relations of the country. For many of these coup-affected governments, the ousted leader was friendly with Western countries, usually the former colonial owner of the nation. Once removed, new allies would be found with enemies of those in the West. In West Africa, this mainly consists of the juntas distancing themselves from France and strengthening relations with Russia, and by extension, the Wagner paramilitary Group.

The Wagner Group has created a new incentive for this relationship with Russia. In the fight against terror in these affected African nations, usually, Western allies would be aiding in the fight against extremism. As these counter-terror activities failed, blame quickly fell onto the Western militaries, from both the country's citizens, politicians, and military. Once a coup had taken place, western allies and International Organisations (like the African Union) would sever all support. This would leave a massive military vacuum as hundreds of troops would be removed from the fight against counter-terror. Strengthening relations with Russia enables these military juntas to use the paramilitary Wagner Group, which already has a strong presence in Africa. Such a dynamic has created a sort of incentive for the military to take control of the government. 

Fighting extremism in Africa has been fraught with tactical and political disasters. So, when public and military support had shifted against the sitting government, militaries didn't have to worry about the implications of a potential coup. Once they had assumed power, they would have a firm ally in Russia. International organisations also impose sanctions on military juntas to deter them from happening. However, the mass of military juntas in Africa means that there is now a support system in place for these new juntas. No longer will financial sanctions devastate the country, because other juntas will assist new ones. This process, and the growing number of juntas in Africa, creates a worrying backdrop to the Nigerien Coup Crisis.

In the early months of 2023, Niger was experiencing a security crisis, facing two insurgencies by two different warring terrorist organizations. JNIM, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgent group, and the Islamic State in the Sahel are both active in Niger and actively fighting against each other. Furthermore, rebel organizations in the neighbouring juntas and criminal bandit gangs are also active around Niger's border. With all of these groups active, vying for control of border areas of Niger, violent attacks are extremely common, not just on other groups but also on politicians and civilians. Niger's military, along with supporting French soldiers, were struggling to properly combat the violence. The background of violence bred a rise in anti-government sentiment and negative attitudes towards France. President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger had been a vocal supporter of France and had criticized his junta neighbours on numerous occasions. He had spoken negatively about the coups of neighbouring Mali and their decisions to employ the Wagner Group. He had criticized Burkina Faso for employing local militias in counter-terrorism. These statements, while endorsing France, galvanized his detractors and even attracted critics from these neighbouring nations.

The growing dislike for the sitting government put pressure on politicians to make changes within the military, in hopes of correcting the issues of the failed counter-terror campaigns. President Mohamed Bazoum had started making plans to remove military leadership from their roles. One of these leaders about to be fired from their position was Abdourahamane Tchiani, the leader of the Presidential Guard. Tchiani had held the position for many years and had defended Bazoum and his predecessor from coup attempts. The decision to remove him had him, and many other military leaders, feeling scorned by Bazoum and his government.

On July 26th, Tchiani, and the Presidential Guardsmen began the coup. Reports came out saying that the Guardsmen were conducting anti-republican activities. Then, it was reported that Bazoum and his family were now hostages within their home. Coup-supporting forces, from other branches of the county's military, began to block off key Governmental buildings and began dispersing crowds of Bazoum's supporters with gunfire. Forces loyal to Bazoum, mainly members of the Army and National Guard, began to take key strategic points, preparing to engage any pro-coup forces on the move. The scene was set for country-wide warfare between government loyalists and pro-coup forces. 

The Chief of the country's air force, and other prominent members from various armed forces branches, took to television to declare his support for the coup and told the general public that Bazoum had been ousted from power. He also formally announced the formation of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (NCSH), Niger's new military junta Government. The military had made their coup obvious and clear, but many believed that Bazoum still held power. He had not resigned or commented on the coup against him. Western nations began to criticise the coup and called for the release of Bazoum.

Nigerien Military Officials on TV Backing the Coup Against Bazoum

Before widespread violence could break between Government loyalists and pro-coup forces, the Chief of Staff for the Nigerien Army signed a document endorsing the coup, to avoid the brutal country-wide fighting. The junta began using their new authoritative powers to suspend all military cooperation with France. The junta also had officials on TV making announcements. Such public displays and immediate action against France had stirred up the critics of Bazoum and France. Thousands took to the streets brandishing Russian flags and vandalising government buildings. Police attempted to disperse the crowds, but a riot quickly broke out with government buildings being set alight. All forms of demonstration were then banned by the Interior Ministry. On July 28th, the Government was officially suspended and General Tchiani was declared as the new head of state. In a statement, delivered on television, Tchiani scorned Bazoum for his lack of cooperation with neighbouring juntas and his unwavering support for France. This was the end of the coup, but not from the crisis. Bazoum and his family had been imprisoned in his home and were not being freed.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an international organisation that covers the area of West Africa. Previously, they had imposed restrictions on military juntas. Seeing the growing trend of coups in West Africa, and the lack of impact from their sanctions, ECOWAS took immediate, decisive action after Niger's coup. Financial sanctions weren't a feasible punishment due to the fostering of military juntas. ECOWAS demanded Bazoum be reinstated by July 30th. When this was not done, they began to discuss mobilising their standing, armed force to physically reinstate him. In early August, the force was raised and plans were made to invade Niger. The junta threatened to kill Bazoum if ECOWAS did so. Since then, there has been a tentative negotiation process between ECOWAS, the junta and the United Nations, all the while Bazoum remains imprisoned. 

To read the initial reactions and analyses as the Nigerien Coup unfolded, check out our first article reporting on it: https://visionmilitarynews.blogspot.com/2023/07/the-ongoing-coup-in-niger-what-we-know.html

Here is another article on the Pro-Russian Movement sweeping through Niger: https://visionmilitarynews.blogspot.com/2023/08/the-post-coup-pro-russian-movement.html

The Coup in Gabon 

The coup in Gabon has one man at the centre of it: President, now former President, Ali Bongo Ondimba. Unlike the other coups in West Africa, Gabon's coup was not prompted by the reaction to violent extremism. In fact, Gabon was a relatively secure country security-wise. Instead, Gabon's coup was caused by internal corruption within the nation's Government. The Bongo family had a vice-like grip on the democratic processes of Gabon since its independence in 1960. Bongo had held office since 2009 when his father passed away, with leadership being passed to him after his death. Since then, his reign has been marred in controversy.

Gabon's Former President Ali Bongo

Gabon is a member of OPEC, an organisation where the world's most petroleum-rich nations cooperate to influence global oil markets. The main goal of this group is to boost revenue for member nations, with other members including Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Mexico. Despite being part of this organisation and being one of Africa's largest oil producers, Gabon's population remains poverty-stricken. Unemployment rates for 15 to 24-year-olds were around 40%, and one-third of the country lived in poverty. The income from Gabon's massive oil exports wasn't reinvested in the country but was absorbed by Bongo and his corrupt Government.

The issue of corruption didn't just plague Gabon's economy but also its elections. Following his re-election in 2016, tensions boiled over in an attempted coup. Bongo was elected with 95.5% of the overall votes, with 99.9% of the county's population voting. These numbers were highly suspect and were met with immediate scepticism from Bongo's detractors. In 2019, a coup was attempted to remove Bongo from power following his years of corruption. This coup failed, and Bongo vowed to keep Gabon stable, unlike other regions in Africa.

The corruption and scandal by Ali Bongo continued, and by 2020, the country had found itself in an economic crisis. In August 2023, Bongo was up for re-election once again, and it was expected that he would lose due to his immense unpopularity. However, once again, he was re-elected in dubious circumstances on August 26th, 2023. His opponent in the elections, and the candidate who had placed second, Albert Ondo Ossa, began to put pressure on Bongo about the election results, believing they had tampered with. When it came time to officially reveal the election results, it was done in the middle of the night, unannounced on state television. Then, curfew measures and internet restrictions were imposed to curb the criticism about the results. Bongo and his Government claimed that the talks of corruption were fake news by those attempting to incite violence. Bongo's re-election was officially announced at 3:30 in the morning by Gabon's Electoral Commission, with him winning with 64% of the overall vote. The early morning announcement did not stop the citizens of Gabon from protesting. Immediately protests began against President Ali Bongo and his corrupt Government. Gabon's military intervened, siding against Bongo. Military officials took to TV Channel Gabon24 to declare that they were removing Bongo from power. One military official said that Bongo was being ousted because of "irresponsible, unpredictable governance," which led to "a continuous degradation of social cohesion." They also announced a border closure and a curfew whilst they removed Bongo from power.

Excerpt from the statement read by the military official: "Our beautiful country, Gabon, has always been a haven of peace. Today, the country is going through a serious institutional, political, economic, and social crisis [...] We are therefore forced to admit that the organisation of the general elections of 26 August 2023 did not meet the conditions for a transparent, credible, and inclusive ballot so much hoped for by the people of Gabon. [...] Added to this is irresponsible and unpredictable governance, resulting in a continuing deterioration in social cohesion, with the risk of leading the country into chaos […] People of Gabon, we are finally on the road to happiness. May God and the spirits of our ancestors bless Gabon. Honour and loyalty to our homeland.”

Bongo, his family and a few close advisors were arrested at his home in Libreville. Some gunshots were heard as crowds were deterred from breaking into the former president's mansion. Inside the house, the Bongo family were unharmed by military personnel. They were all arrested for their involvement in fraudulent government procedures and placed under immediate house arrest. Suitcases full of Central African Francs were also recovered which may have been stashed campaign funds by the Bongo family. Whilst under house arrest, Ali Bongo took to social media to call for his supporters to protest his removal and to reinstate him as President of Gabon. Following this video post, the Bongo Family had their phones confiscated. Those arrested were:

• Ali Bongo [Former President]- Detained 
• Noureddin Bongo Valentin [President Bongo's Oldest Son & Advisor]- Detained
• Sylvia Valentin [Wife of President Bongo]- Charged with Money Laundering, Receiving Stolen Goods, Forgery and Fraud
• Richard Auguste Onouviet [President of the National Assembley]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Ian Ghislian Ngoulou [Presidential Chief of Staff]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Mohamed Ali Saliou [Deputy Chief of Staff]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Jessye Ella Ekogha [Presidential Spokesperson]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Unnamed Presidential Advisor- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Two Officials in Bongo's Affiliated Party, the Gabonese Democratic Party- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking

The military appointed Brigadier General Brice Oligui as the new interim president of Gabon whilst they sought to form a transitional government. Oligui was the leader of the Republican Guard, Gabon's security force and Presidential guard. Oligui is no stranger to politics, with him being a close advisor to Ali Bongo's father Omar Bongo. He was met with celebration, being carried through the streets by Gabonese citizens upon his appointment. In an interview with a French publication, Oligui spoke about the discontentment felt by the Gabonese people and that he would lead the new Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions, a committee that would create an established, functioning Government. He said that reconstructing these institutions would be done quickly, but proper due diligence would be taken to avoid the pitfalls of corruption. He also stated that Bongo was officially retired from politics.

Gabonese citizens celebrating the removal of Bongo

In the weeks after Bongo's removal, the country returned to normality with borders being reopened, internet services restored to normal and curfews being phased out. In the months following Oligui has stuck to his promise and has slowly begun building up a transitional government cabinet. In November, he announced that elections for a new President would be held in August 2025. As for Bongo, he was released from confinement and allowed to leave the country. It was revealed that the former President was suffering from major health complications and that he needed to leave the country to seek treatment. Bongo received treatment abroad and returned to his residence in Libreville where he now lives.

The Coup in Gabon highlights the previous failings of African Democracies. Whereby a corrupt group of individuals could deprive an entire nation of its wealth. Greed, corruption and power had blinded Bongo, forcing him to commit illegal acts to stay in power. His ousting was celebrated widely in Gabon and it remains unclear if he will stand trial for his alleged crimes.

To read the initial reactions and analyses as the Gabonese Coup unfolded, check out our first article reporting on it: https://visionmilitarynews.blogspot.com/2023/08/the-ongoing-unrest-coup-in-gabon.html

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Follow The Money: Crowdfunding, Terrorism & Charity

Crowdfunding is something that has become globally known over the past decade. With discussions surrounding crowdfunding come the stories of its misuse. Whether people lie to receive donations or those who e-beg on social media, crowdfunding has its fair share of controversies. It is not only fraudsters who exploit these services but also terror organisations. Crowdfunding websites allow terrorists to act in plain sight, masquerading behind or sometimes as charitable organisations to receive funds. This issue reaches beyond the crowdfunding space. The economic exemptions and rules for non-profits allow them to become a target for money laundering. These tactics from terror organisations prey on ordinary people who believe they are giving to charity, but are, in fact, contributing to terror activity.

How does Crowdfunding contribute to Terrorism?

The way in which crowdfunding websites are set up allows for terrorism to use the site with ease. This makes these donation websites the most susceptible to being exploited by terrorist organisations. These illicit organisations purposefully seek out websites that have major flaws so they can act more productively. Many crowdfunding sites have dubious and vague conditions which do not explicitly disallow terror-inciting content. They also target websites that allow owners to keep funds, even though their monetary goal was not met. The method of payment is important to these extremists. Some websites make it so donators remain anonymous, hiding their identity behind a username or allowing anonymous donating. Crowdfunding sites that allow crypto and donations through dubious financial institutions are also ideal to terrorists. These payment methods obscure the identity of the donators and of the campaign runners, allowing them to act without any attention from the authorities. Terrorists also look for similar terror incitement campaigns on the website. If they find evidence of other terror organisations operating on the website then they are reassured that they too can operate unimpeded. The details of the actual campaign are also crucial to spotting those established by terrorist organisations. The biggest indicator is a lack of or unclear background information about the campaign. Their names can be broad, generic terms. For example, 'save the children, or 'helping refugees in conflict zones'. They purposefully make these campaigns look charitable as sympathetic ideas to attract donations from more people. This also makes it possible for unsuspecting people to make donations. The same campaign being posted across numerous crowdfunding sites and offering a variety of payment methods are also a red flag for terrorist activity. Sometimes, these campaigns will offer donation links in the actual descriptions, allowing for the website's payment method to be bypassed completely. This not only means that payments won't be recorded on the website, but also allows donators to further obscure their identity.

Often, terrorist campaigns are easy to spot. The descriptions will discuss political issues in a hateful rhetoric or be openly supportive of terrorism. Usually, their goals will be far larger than similar campaigns in its category and have much more support. Another easy way is to check the legitimacy of associated charities. Sometimes, campaigns will mention another non-profit to bolster their legitimacy. In reality, these charities are usually not associated with the campaign in any way or are also controlled by terror organisations. Checking the legitimacy or contacting listed charities are the best way to find their legitimacy. Often times, a simple Google search will turn up reports of terror-linked charities. This is the same with the campaign's creator. Often times, the creator is also linked to terrorism in some way. The day the campaign is posted may also hold some significance to the terrorist organisation. Checking the day of a campaign's posting may also reveal a link to terrorism.

Donors to these campaigns can vary quite significantly. Most of the time, terrorists coordinate with pre-established donors, who direct their funds to the desired campaign. Sometimes, it can be from unwitting donors who just want to direct their money towards a charity, unknowingly supporting terrorist activity. Donors are the biggest asterisk in identifying criminal crowdfunding campaigns. All because a donator has links to terrorism or financial crime, doesn't mean that all of the campaigns they contribute to are affiliated. It is common for donators who do contribute to terror run campaigns to spread their funds across various legitimate campaigns to cover their tracks. This way authorities can't easily see which campaign is run by terrorists. When examining a campaign's donators there are certain telltale signs that show authorities that they are contributing to terrorists. Things like: abnormally large donation amounts, use of cryptocurrency to donate and if the donators have donated to other terrorist run campaigns. It can also be the case that these donators aren't real and are instead bot accounts created by a single donator. This is done to spread large donations across several smaller transactions, as to not raise the eyebrows of the authorities. Admins can usually detect these fake accounts as they share the same IP address or bank account as the other accounts.

To summarise, crowdfunding websites are vulnerable to terrorist campaigns. When looking to donate to an unverified campaign, there are several things authorities and donators can do to see if it is run by terror organisations: 

• Avoid crowdfunding sites without proper verification or bad terms of service. 
• Check if the campaign's goals are similar to other campaigns in its category. 
• Check the description of the campaign to see if the aims of the campaign are specific. 
• See if the date it was posted aligns with any significant terror events. 
• Research the donator's background. See if their accounts are legitimate and what other campaigns they have pledged to. 

Social Media's Role in Funding Terrorism

Social media's role in recruiting terrorists is well known, but what isn't is how it transformed the way in which terrorism is funded. The widespread use of social media allows for terrorist groups to send messages and cryptocurrency without impediment, especially through encrypted services like Telegram. The two biggest users of social media to bolster their funding is ISIS and Al-Qaeda. These websites allow terrorist run accounts to pool resources and in conjunction with cryptocurrency, allows them to do so nearly anonymously. Social media has regulation but maintaining the online space is extremely costly. Websites like Facebook and Twitter rely on user-submitted reports to monitor the site. This rather lacklustre approach to moderations allows for terrorists to remain active. The anonymous, unregulated nature of cryptocurrency allows these unmonitored accounts to now move funds, as well.

Many of the most popular social media sites have a documented history of allowing or unknowingly fostering communities of terrorists. During the 2010s, it was found that Facebook had not banned several ISIS-affiliated accounts who were using the site for recruitment and funding purposes. Even though these accounts violated their terms of services, they did not ban them. Furthermore, the maintaining of these pro-terror communities creates an echo chamber for such activity. It not only promotes but strengthens support among terror operatives. Furthermore, these groups can establish and coordinate fraudulent non-profit accounts to support their efforts.

The Non-Profit Issue in Serbia

Serbia is a country that has faced the most prominent issues with terrorists using non-profits to fund their operations. Serbia is the ideal place for terrorists to do this for a number of reasons. Their non-profit financial laws are not as strong as other European nations. Serbia is a cash-reliant country, where 30% of the county's transactions are done in cash. Registration laws and checks for charities in the country are also extremely lax, allowing for organizations to establish themselves as non-profit without submitting the proper documentation. Many religious non-profits are exempt from having to submit such documentation, allowing for religious terrorists to infiltrate the sector easily. Serbia has no financial agency dedicated to overseeing the non-profit sector. They only have the conventional police and tax authorities, who are already burdened with other financial enforcement work. Other European nations have regulatory bodies that focus purely on non-profits. This lack of a central non-profit regulator also means that it is harder for these authorities to properly investigate fraudulent charities, as there is no central place to find documentation. When checks are done to new non-profits, they are so loose that they're essentially meaningless. There is no strategy in place for differing authorities to communicate with one another about such issues.

The SBRA is the closest institution Serbia has to a non-profit regulatory body. However, the SBRA performs terribly. They keep little information and fail to do proper background checks. Key data, including the founder of the charity and where they operate, has mostly been lost. In a study, done by the European Union, it was found that there were 58 non-profit organizations active in Serbia and in other locations overseas. There was no documentation, aims, goals, or financial documentation from these 58 organizations. Almost nothing is known about these organizations. These failings make it incredibly easy for terrorists to infiltrate the sector.

Such little documentation and disregard of the rules make it incredibly easy for terrorists to abuse non-profits in Serbia. Of those 58 organizations active overseas, none have their other country listed. They could be active in high-risk areas, such as Syria, Somalia, or Afghanistan, where they could be actively funding terror groups. Thankfully, the European Union has been working closely with Serbia to improve their financial security laws. Even with basic data and documentation checks in place, terrorists will take a massive hit, as their exploitation of non-profits will be evident. The establishment of financial regulatory foundations will be invaluable to countering financial crime in Serbia.

Tags: Financial crime, Money laundering, Fraud prevention, Anti-money laundering (AML), Cybercrime, Financial fraud, Identity theft, White-collar crime, Compliance regulations, Risk management, Fraud detection, Regulatory compliance, Financial security, Insider trading, Banking fraud, Ponzi scheme, Corruption, Cybersecurity, Know Your Customer (KYC),Suspicious activity

Islamic State's Terror Threat to the Religious Political Parties of Pakistan

On July 31st of this year, a suicide bomber attacked the party convention of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JU)), a conservative religious party in Pakistan. The brutal bombing killed 63 people, including 23 children, and left more than 100 others injured. Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility for the attack. This attack marked the deadliest yet on Pakistan's religious political parties, raising questions about the reasons behind IS's intensified campaign against them. In this video, we will explore how the Islamic State is targeting the religious far-right in Pakistan and why their efforts are being focused on the JUI.

First, let's examine the party history of the JUI and how it offers a unique religious approach to politics in Pakistan and the wider Middle East. The party originated as a political group for Deobandis in British India in 1919. Deobandis adhere to the Deobandi school of thought in Sunni Islam. The party, initially known as Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), consisted of politically active, anti-colonialist Deobandis. Within the party, a significant faction supported the idea of a separate state for Indian Muslims, leading to a split in 1945. This faction joined the All-India Muslim League, which aimed to establish the Muslim state of Pakistan and became known as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Pakistan.

A few years after joining the All-Indian Muslim League, the JUI parted ways with the group and formed the Markazi Ulema-e-Islam, contributing to the religious foundations of Pakistan. Under new leadership in the early 1960s, the JUI became more politically active. However, it wasn't until the 1970s and 1980s that the JUI played a significant role in the Middle East. This period was marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which deeply affected Pakistan. President General Zia ul Haq declared a jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, a move that divided the JUI. Some members disagreed with these policies, while others supported the president. The JUI received substantial financial support during this time, which enabled them to establish madrassas in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. These institutions played a crucial role in educating and assisting Taliban members, who would go on to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The internal divide within the JUI during the Zia administration eventually led to a split after the death of the longtime party leader Mufti Mehmood, resulting in the formation of the Zia-supporting JUI-S and the non-Zia JUI-F. 

The JUI-F proved to be more influential than its breakaway faction. Today, it is a minority party in Pakistan, with four members in the country's senate. Despite its minority status, the party is highly religious and actively advocates for the implementation of Sharia law. The JUI-F also has a unique role in Pakistani politics, controlling numerous mosques and madrassas across the country, which serve as hubs for activism and campaigns. It is estimated that both JUI factions collectively oversee 65% of all madrassas in Pakistan. These madrassas have also served as centres for Afghan students sympathetic to the Taliban, with around 30,000 Afghan students who attended JUI-affiliated madrassas later becoming Taliban members. The JUI's connections to scholars mean that highly educated individuals teach at these institutions. Notably, while the JUI-F has educated numerous Taliban members, it does not endorse militarism and instead promotes democracy. In contrast, the JUI-S openly supports militarism and operates madrassas that have openly taught Taliban leadership. After the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, both JUI factions united in campaigning for the Pakistani Government to cease its support for NATO, specifically condemning the use of drones by the U.S. in tribal areas of Pakistan. Following the assassination of JUI-S' leader Samiul Haq in 2018, the splinter party ceased its operations. After obtaining approval from Pakistan's Electoral Commission, the JUI-F was officially renamed the JUI. Today, the JUI continues to play a significant role in religious education in Pakistan, though it holds only four seats in Pakistan's Senate.

Given their extensive links and religious prominence, it's no surprise that the JUI has become a target for the Islamic State. Since 2019, Islamic State has escalated its attacks on the JUI. In that year, ISKP initiated an assassination campaign against JUI activists in the Bajaur District. Alongside these targeted assassinations, ISKP intensified its propaganda against the political party. In their newsletters, IS criticized the JUI for its support of democracy, a stance at odds with the core doctrine of the terror group. Both physical and media attacks against the party surged. By 2022, ISKP issued a fatwa, an Islamic religious declaration, calling for the killing of all scholars associated with the JUI, citing their close ties to the Taliban. This fatwa came following the death of a JUI-affiliated teacher named Mufti Shafiullah. Intelligence experts believe that this fatwa was issued in response to the JUI's efforts to secure international recognition for the Taliban Government in Afghanistan. Subsequent months saw further killings and attacks against educators linked to the JUI. The recent attack on the party's convention underscores that ISKP continues to actively target the religious far-right in Pakistan, especially those with connections to the Taliban.

Several key reasons explain why the JUI has become a prime target for the Islamic State's brutal attacks. Many may question why such a devastating campaign is waged against a relatively small political party in Pakistan. However, when considering the party's history and religious significance, the motivations behind the relentless attacks become clearer. IS is dedicated to establishing an Islamic Caliphate without a functioning democracy. The mere presence of a religious political party actively participating in democracy challenges this vision, making the JUI a target. While the attacks may be viewed as a means to discourage democratic engagement, the JUI's affiliations with the Taliban make it a primary target for IS. Since the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan, the JUI has increased its diplomatic and educational support for the Taliban. The attacks on JUI scholars can be seen as a direct threat to those assisting the Taliban in gaining international recognition. Additionally, the JUI's long history of aiding the Taliban further makes it susceptible to attacks. IS's assaults serve as both a deterrent to the madrassas educating Taliban members across the country and a disruptive method, eliminating affiliated teachers for said madrassas. The JUI's role as a religious party puts it at odds with IS's interpretation of Islam, leading to disagreements on core religious principles and creating further animosity. The JUI's interpretation of Islam is something they widely platform through their controlled madrassas and mosques, spreading the JUI's ideas of Islam to thousands of students. The JUI's active role in promoting this view through religious education makes it a prime target for attack from IS. 

These three main characteristics of the JUI place it at the forefront of the Islamic State's terror campaign in Pakistan. The presence of a religious political party engaging in democracy, its alliances with the Taliban, and its role in promoting a differing view of Islam compared to IS make it a direct adversary to the terror organization. The recent attack on the party's convention was one of the most audacious and deadly assaults by IS against the JUI. Despite this, Pakistan remains committed to combating IS. Its recent alliances with Iran and China in countering terrorism are expected to deal a significant blow to terror organizations across the Middle East.

The UN's Monitor Report: Fighting Al Qaeda and Islamic State in Africa

On July 24th, the UN Security Council released a Monitor Report on Al Qaeda and Islamic State, updating the world on the ongoing fight against the two largest terror organisations. Though the report looks at multiple areas of the world, in this article we will solely focus on the developments made against the terror groups in the African continent. Updates from other continents will be covered in another article. 

North Africa

In the north of the continent, both terror groups were found to be at their weakest. In the past few years, major affiliate organisations in North Africa have been hit hard. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has moved into northern Mali. Islamic State affiliate, Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia (JAK-T) is facing major financing issues. Following the deaths of many of its prominent members, JAK-T is believed to be hiding in the Samama Mountains in Tunisia. There are believed to be only fifteen members left of this group. 

In Morocco, there has been immense success in fighting these terror organisations. Counter-terror authorities have shut down five terrorist cells that were working with the Core Islamic State organisation or its affiliate in the Great Sahara (ISGS). In total, twenty-five people were arrested, with one cell having plans to rob banks across Morocco to fund IS terror operations.

In Libya, the fight against Islamic State has been frought with difficulty due to the affiliate's connections to organised crime. The affiliate, Islamic State in the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya), has close links to organised crime groups that control trafficking routes in the country. The report also suggests that ISIL-Libya are attempting to infiltrate local tribes to aid in recruitment, especially in the south of the country. One of the scariest things revealed by the report is that ISIL-Libya is focusing its efforts on recruiting chemists and scientists in hopes of committing more sophisticated attacks. The group has around three hundred to five hundred members and is currently based in southern Libya, where they are free from Government intervention. The Government in Libya is still unstable and does not have full control over the entire country. The south, and some central regions, are absent from any Government or authority. Their close relationships with organised criminals have allowed them to reorganise themselves in the Fezzan Province. The UN Report also indicates that ISIL-Libya may have training camps in Fezzan, where they train fighters going to West Africa and the Sahel. 

Despite the reorganisation of the group, Libyan authorities have dismantled several terror cells. Most notably, an engineer was arrested when he was attempting to sabotage gas pipelines using armed drones. More concerning, was the handbook retrieved whilst arresting the engineer. The book contained instructions on how to create poison and biological weapons. It is believed these plans come directly from the ISIL Core.

Intelligence gathering against the group has been diligent and thorough, with the structure of the organisation being known. ISIL-Libya is believed to be divided into four sub-groups each specialising in different areas of terror operation. The sub-groups consist of a bombmaking team, a security team, fighters and a military commission. 

Al Qaeda has also entrenched itself in southern Libya. Much like the Islamic State in the south, Al Qaeda uses its position in southern Libya to support its affiliates in the Sahel. The report also indicates that ISIL-Libya and Al-Qaeda in southern Libya collaborate and share resources. Al Qaeda has a much smaller force of only one hundred and fifty to three hundred fighters in southern Libya. Most of these fighters are moving through the area to countries like Niger, Mali and Sudan. It is also believed that these operations are aided by the Tuareg, a semi-nomadic, ethnic group in southern Libya. Intelligence also suggests that Libyan terror groups are using the instability in Sudan to transport fighters to and from West Africa.

Libyan Counter-terror Forces

In Egypt, the Al Qaeda-aligned group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) have been nearly destroyed by counter-terror forces. According to the UN Report, local and core structures of the terror organisation have been largely disbanded. The last major attack by the group occurred in December 2022 and is viewed as an act of desperation, with the group's total members estimated to be in the tens or low hundreds. The group's activities in the Sinai Peninsula have been heavily affected by Egypt's investment in local infrastructure and community outreach. Where local communities once acted as potential recruitment sites for the group, now they are aligned with Egypt's Government. 

West Africa 

In West Africa, affiliate groups play an instrumental role in creating instability. As it becomes more difficult to communicate with the faltering core groups, local affiliates' autonomy is the biggest terror threat in West Africa. One group in particular, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-muslimin (JNIM), currently poses the biggest threat to West African nations. Previously, the group were contained in Mali, but now it seems they have ramped up operations in Burkina Faso. It's believed the increase in operations is being done to apply pressure on local authorities during negotiations. With the escalation of the group's tactics, it seems the once Al Qaeda-affiliated group is now distancing itself from the core organisation. Not only is it straying from Al-Qaeda's core doctrine, but also separating itself from local affiliated groups. In battle, JNIM do not fight under the Al Qaeda flag, but under their own banner. JINM's new terror campaign in Burkina Faso has brought with it many issues for the group. Since JNIM encompasses a number of local fighters, usually beliefs and agendas conflict with one another creating tension within the organisation. 

Despite expanding as an organisation, it seems as if JNIM can not compete with the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (ISGS), the IS affiliate in West Africa. The Tri-Border area between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali has become a warring ground for terror organisations. JNIM has suffered major losses at the hands of ISGS, despite fighting alongside Tuareg Militias in the area. It is important to note that these losses for JNIM in border areas do not reflect the group's control further West. Intelligence suggests that Mali's capital is encircled by JNIM, allowing them full control of the entire area up to the southern border. Through local battalions, JNIM can control local political and security disputes. Mali's weak military is also unable to properly fight back against the terror group. The report also implies that the expanded presence of the Wagner Group has done little to combat the influence of JNIM. From these controlled positions in Mali, JNIM can effectively launch attacks in Burkina Faso and the southern Sahel. 

The strongest of these JNIM battalions is the Katiba Macina, a force which acts almost autonomously from the rest of the JNIM organisation. The Katiba Macina are most active in Burkina Faso, where the force takes advantage of the instability created by locals, making it hard to distinguish between JNIM advances or just community clashes. They also work closely with the rebel group Ansarul Islam. With their most powerful battalion in Burkina Faso, JNIM has a commanding presence over authorities. JNIM's desire to expand to the southern border of Burkina Faso has also created spillover terrorism in regions of Benin, Togo and Niger.

JNIM Fighters in the Sahel

Unlike Al Qaeda affiliates, ISGS remain dedicated to the Core organisation of the Islamic State. The IS affiliate has had some major setbacks with leading members being killed by International forces and by the JNIM. The leadership of ISGS is primarily Arab, with some Fulani deputies. Most of the affiliate's fighters are of Fulani descent. The report believes that this creates a huge potential for infighting and internal descension within the affiliate group. The predominantly Fulani fighting force of ISGS has inadvertently restricted the group's expansion. Many of the Fulani fighters of ISGS do not want to participate in fratricide, as most of the Katiba Macina are also of Fulani descent. This and the fact that ISGS fighters are stretched thin across multiple fronts make the affiliate's advances a lot slower than first expected. Niger seems to be ISGS' new prime target, with multiple attacks taking place across northern regions of the country. These attacks aim to strengthen their supply and recruitment routes from Nigeria. 

Central and Southern Africa

We will start this section by looking at the ongoing situation in Mozambique, where the Islamic State-affiliated terror organisation Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama (ASWJ) continues its campaign. ASWJ are a smaller force of around one hundred and eighty to two hundred fighters. Despite their size, they carry out attacks relentlessly. Since January, the UN Report states that nearly sixty-five members have been killed. Even though this was a major blow to the terror group, displaced fighters would form small terror cells to continue carrying out attacks. Mozambique and South African Development Community counter-terror forces have launched numerous attacks on the group, targeting their leadership. These have been a success with an overall decrease in terror attacks and civilian deaths.

One way ASWJ is attempting to survive is through inroads with local communities. Specifically trying to forge relationships with farmers and small businesses. The UN Report believes that this is being done in an attempt to sustain the group economically. Despite being an affiliate group of IS, there is no evidence to suggest that ASWJ is taking orders from the Core organisation. Most of the foreign fighters for the group come from surrounding African nations, like Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a joint operation between the army and Ugandan forces continues to take place against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Operation Sujaa, as it is known, has been incredibly successful. ADF bases have been raided, over four hundred fighters have been killed, eighty-one were arrested and just over one-hundred and fifty-one abductees were freed. The most notable success of Operation Sujaa was the assassination of Mulalo Seguja, the leader of the ADF's political faction. 

The success of the counter-terror operations has not stopped the ADF's attacks. In the eastern region of North Kivu, the ADF used a large IED to kill sixteen civilians and injure sixty others. The IED was the biggest made by the ADF. The device is believed to have weighed anywhere from seven to ten kilograms. These large explosives seem to be used by a specific ADF General, named Abwakasi. It is thought that over five hundred civilians had been killed by the ADF in the past six months. It is also believed that the ADF has an overall size of one thousand five hundred to two thousand fighters. The group has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, but there is no evidence they are taking orders from the terror organisation.

East Africa

One of the biggest counter-offensives going on in the continent of Africa right now is the one against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Airstrikes and raids against leading members have been extremely successful. Leaders of the financial wing of the terror group have been targeted to curb the massive revenue they pull in from extortion. The report estimates that the group collects $100 million per year. The terror group is believed to have between seven thousand to twelve thousand members. 

Retaliatory attacks from Al-Shabaab have occurred, mainly against members of ATMIS, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia. Just a few months ago, five hundred Al-Shabaab fighters attacked a Ugandan ATMIS military base. ATMIS, Somali and US forces plan on advancing further south as the counter-offensive against the group continues. These southern areas, specifically Middle and Lower Juba, are key locations for the terror group. It is expected that the severity of the fighting will increase, as Al-Shabaab desperately defend these important positions.

Intelligence also suggests that there is a small Islamic State presence in Somalia. The small force of around one hundred to two hundred fighters is located in Puntland. The report suggests the group is struggling to expand due to constant attacks by Al-Shabaab. In January, Islamic State in Somalia was hit hard after one of their chief finance officers was killed by the US. This hurt the group's massive network of financial hubs that they have across Africa. One aspect of the Islamic State in Somalia that the report focused on was the Al-Karrar Office, a financial hub that sends money to other affiliate groups. Some member states believe that the Al-Karrar Office is the financial backbone of the Islamic State, whilst others claim these numbers are overestimated. These other member states believe that the al-Furqan Office in West Africa is the real financial backbone of the group. 

ATMIS Soldiers in Somalia

Many member states also fear that terror groups will take advantage of the current instability in Sudan. Specifically, Islamic State. Since 2019, there has been an IS terror cell in the country led by Abu Bakr Al-Iraqi. Orders from the IS Core tasked the IS leader with creating a terror cell. The cell is believed to be made up of one hundred to two hundred members. Its main purpose seems to be a logistical one, though many member states fear this will change. The report also indicates that Al-Iraqi has set up several fake investment/money-transfer businesses registered in Sudan and Türkiye. Al-Iraqi has also made substantial investments in Sudanese businesses. 

Iran's Fostering of Terrorism Against Israel

The Lions' Den Group

On June 25th, Cypriot authorities foiled an attempted attack on an Israeli businessman. Counter-terror intelligence suggests that the attack was actually orchestrated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a branch of the country's armed forces. This is the most recent instance of the Iranian government's repeated attacks against Israel, either in an official capacity or by supporting terror operatives.

 

Earlier this year, Greek counter-terror authorities apprehended two Pakistani nationals who were aided by the Iranian Government. The two men planned on committing an attack against an Israeli-owned restaurant. The IRGC has also been linked to several other terror plots in the past, with the most recent occurring just last year in Turkey. Intelligence from Shin Bet, the Israeli security agency, suggests that the Palestinian militant organisation Lions' Den is being aided and supported by the Iranian Government. The Lions' Den is often well-equipped with automatic weapons and tactical gear, which seems to have been supplied by the Iranian Government. The agency's director Ronen Bar also suggested that Islamic State has also aided terror attacks against Israel. 

With the instances of Iran fostering terrorism against Israel becoming more common, one wonders whether it will affect the country's relationship with other nations. On multiple occasions, Iran has aided terrorism within multiple other countries. The involvement of the IRGC indicates that these operations are far from secret, but rather openly carried out by the country's armed forces. 

China, Pakistan & Iran hold Trilateral Meeting to Deal with Terrorism

China, Pakistan and Iran: The Trilateral Alliance to Fight Terrorism in the Middle East

Iranian Border Guards Along the Iran-Pakistan Border

In recent years, China's investments in the Middle East have become a primary target for terrorism. Just weeks ago, Pakistani police forcefully closed businesses out of fear that they could be potential targets for terror attacks. For Pakistan and Iran, the Islamic State and the Taliban pose the greatest threats to stability within their respective countries, as these groups continue to wreak havoc in the Middle East.

On June 7th, a meeting was scheduled in Beijing, where China aimed to find a resolution to the terror attacks. As mentioned earlier, Chinese investments and assets are frequently targeted by terrorist organisations in these countries. The trilateral meeting between the countries marks the beginning of a new anti-terror alliance. One of the key agenda items is the security crisis in the Pakistani region of Baluchistan, which is crucial for China's multi-billion-dollar economic corridor. Baluchistan is also rich in natural resources, making it an area of interest for economic development. However, the region is plagued by extreme poverty, crime, and insurgency. Combating terrorism in the area is challenging, as many terrorist operatives cross the border into Iran to evade persecution.

The Iranian province that shares a border with Baluchistan, Sistan-Baluchistan, also grapples with insurgency problems. Iranian Shiite government forces are currently engaged in fighting against several Sunni militant groups, which have carried out a number of attacks across the country. Iran asserts that Pakistan is not doing enough to curtail Sunni militancy.

Despite accusations of insufficient action from both sides, Iran and Pakistan maintain close diplomatic relations. In the past month, the leaders of both countries met at their shared border to inaugurate a new market and powerline. With China holding significant economic investments in both countries, this new alliance appears to be mutually beneficial. China's investments can now receive protection from terrorism, while Iran and Pakistan can address the growing threat of terrorism within their borders. The Taliban-controlled Afghanistan poses a major obstacle for the alliance, as it is believed to harbour and assist Al-Qaeda-aligned groups. Reports suggest that multiple key members of these groups hold influential positions within the Afghan government.