Islamic State's Terror Threat to the Religious Political Parties of Pakistan
On July 31st of this year, a suicide bomber attacked the party convention of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JU)), a conservative religious party in Pakistan. The brutal bombing killed 63 people, including 23 children, and left more than 100 others injured. Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed responsibility for the attack. This attack marked the deadliest yet on Pakistan's religious political parties, raising questions about the reasons behind IS's intensified campaign against them. In this video, we will explore how the Islamic State is targeting the religious far-right in Pakistan and why their efforts are being focused on the JUI.
First, let's examine the party history of the JUI and how it offers a unique religious approach to politics in Pakistan and the wider Middle East. The party originated as a political group for Deobandis in British India in 1919. Deobandis adhere to the Deobandi school of thought in Sunni Islam. The party, initially known as Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), consisted of politically active, anti-colonialist Deobandis. Within the party, a significant faction supported the idea of a separate state for Indian Muslims, leading to a split in 1945. This faction joined the All-India Muslim League, which aimed to establish the Muslim state of Pakistan and became known as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Pakistan.
A few years after joining the All-Indian Muslim League, the JUI parted ways with the group and formed the Markazi Ulema-e-Islam, contributing to the religious foundations of Pakistan. Under new leadership in the early 1960s, the JUI became more politically active. However, it wasn't until the 1970s and 1980s that the JUI played a significant role in the Middle East. This period was marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which deeply affected Pakistan. President General Zia ul Haq declared a jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, a move that divided the JUI. Some members disagreed with these policies, while others supported the president. The JUI received substantial financial support during this time, which enabled them to establish madrassas in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. These institutions played a crucial role in educating and assisting Taliban members, who would go on to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The internal divide within the JUI during the Zia administration eventually led to a split after the death of the longtime party leader Mufti Mehmood, resulting in the formation of the Zia-supporting JUI-S and the non-Zia JUI-F.
The JUI-F proved to be more influential than its breakaway faction. Today, it is a minority party in Pakistan, with four members in the country's senate. Despite its minority status, the party is highly religious and actively advocates for the implementation of Sharia law. The JUI-F also has a unique role in Pakistani politics, controlling numerous mosques and madrassas across the country, which serve as hubs for activism and campaigns. It is estimated that both JUI factions collectively oversee 65% of all madrassas in Pakistan. These madrassas have also served as centres for Afghan students sympathetic to the Taliban, with around 30,000 Afghan students who attended JUI-affiliated madrassas later becoming Taliban members. The JUI's connections to scholars mean that highly educated individuals teach at these institutions. Notably, while the JUI-F has educated numerous Taliban members, it does not endorse militarism and instead promotes democracy. In contrast, the JUI-S openly supports militarism and operates madrassas that have openly taught Taliban leadership. After the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, both JUI factions united in campaigning for the Pakistani Government to cease its support for NATO, specifically condemning the use of drones by the U.S. in tribal areas of Pakistan. Following the assassination of JUI-S' leader Samiul Haq in 2018, the splinter party ceased its operations. After obtaining approval from Pakistan's Electoral Commission, the JUI-F was officially renamed the JUI. Today, the JUI continues to play a significant role in religious education in Pakistan, though it holds only four seats in Pakistan's Senate.
Given their extensive links and religious prominence, it's no surprise that the JUI has become a target for the Islamic State. Since 2019, Islamic State has escalated its attacks on the JUI. In that year, ISKP initiated an assassination campaign against JUI activists in the Bajaur District. Alongside these targeted assassinations, ISKP intensified its propaganda against the political party. In their newsletters, IS criticized the JUI for its support of democracy, a stance at odds with the core doctrine of the terror group. Both physical and media attacks against the party surged. By 2022, ISKP issued a fatwa, an Islamic religious declaration, calling for the killing of all scholars associated with the JUI, citing their close ties to the Taliban. This fatwa came following the death of a JUI-affiliated teacher named Mufti Shafiullah. Intelligence experts believe that this fatwa was issued in response to the JUI's efforts to secure international recognition for the Taliban Government in Afghanistan. Subsequent months saw further killings and attacks against educators linked to the JUI. The recent attack on the party's convention underscores that ISKP continues to actively target the religious far-right in Pakistan, especially those with connections to the Taliban.
Several key reasons explain why the JUI has become a prime target for the Islamic State's brutal attacks. Many may question why such a devastating campaign is waged against a relatively small political party in Pakistan. However, when considering the party's history and religious significance, the motivations behind the relentless attacks become clearer. IS is dedicated to establishing an Islamic Caliphate without a functioning democracy. The mere presence of a religious political party actively participating in democracy challenges this vision, making the JUI a target. While the attacks may be viewed as a means to discourage democratic engagement, the JUI's affiliations with the Taliban make it a primary target for IS. Since the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan, the JUI has increased its diplomatic and educational support for the Taliban. The attacks on JUI scholars can be seen as a direct threat to those assisting the Taliban in gaining international recognition. Additionally, the JUI's long history of aiding the Taliban further makes it susceptible to attacks. IS's assaults serve as both a deterrent to the madrassas educating Taliban members across the country and a disruptive method, eliminating affiliated teachers for said madrassas. The JUI's role as a religious party puts it at odds with IS's interpretation of Islam, leading to disagreements on core religious principles and creating further animosity. The JUI's interpretation of Islam is something they widely platform through their controlled madrassas and mosques, spreading the JUI's ideas of Islam to thousands of students. The JUI's active role in promoting this view through religious education makes it a prime target for attack from IS.
These three main characteristics of the JUI place it at the forefront of the Islamic State's terror campaign in Pakistan. The presence of a religious political party engaging in democracy, its alliances with the Taliban, and its role in promoting a differing view of Islam compared to IS make it a direct adversary to the terror organization. The recent attack on the party's convention was one of the most audacious and deadly assaults by IS against the JUI. Despite this, Pakistan remains committed to combating IS. Its recent alliances with Iran and China in countering terrorism are expected to deal a significant blow to terror organizations across the Middle East.
