A Year in Counter Terrorism: The Counter-Offensive Against Al-Shabaab in Somalia

2023 has been a monumental year in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. For nearly two decades, the Somali Government has been fighting the terror group Al-Shabaab. This year, a second phase of a joint counter-offensive against the group was carried out. African Union, US, Somali, and other African nation troops came together to strike back against Al-Shabaab. This year has seen two phases of the counter-offensive, the first dealing with Al-Shabaab in the central regions of the country and the second seeing allied militaries push into the heartlands of Al-Shabaab-controlled territory.

Phase One

Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from August 2022 [The Start of Phase One]

Phase One of this counter-offensive began in August of 2022. This opening phase consisted of consolidating military power in northern regions and pushing Al-Shabaab out of the country's central regions. In these opening months, the Somali Government began to rally the support of local clans and militias active in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Previously, these clans and local forces were left out of military activity. The failings of the Somali Government in the past had radically changed their views on these local forces. It was apparent that without these local clans' support, successfully defeating Al-Shabaab would not have been possible. The Government also found key targets in Central Somalia to focus their attacks on. In particular, numerous Al-Shabaab strongholds in central Somalia were the main targets of this first phase.

As the nation entered 2023, the dimensions of the first phase had transformed radically. Political tensions within Somalia had ruptured ties to some of the local clans. An incident involving tax collection issues with some of these local clans caused them to no longer cooperate with Somalia's Government. This hampered this first phase enormously, as Al-Shabaab sought to negotiate with these local clans, to stop their resistance against them. The negotiations between the local fighters and Al-Shabaab occurred in the key areas of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The lack of local clan support in these key areas, caused Somalia to turn to their international allies to aid them in continuing the counter-offensive.

These key allies would be instrumental in continuing, and eventually, ending this first phase successfully. Several neighbouring African nations have their own forces fighting Al-Shabaab, independent of the African Union. Many of these neighbouring countries have forces pledged to the African Union as well. African Union troops were instrumental in carrying out raids on towns in these central regions. The US would also be instrumental in aiding the Somali Government. Particularly, the Air Force would prove incredibly useful in eliminating key members of Al-Shabaab. Somalia's own military and security forces were also key in eliminating Al-Shabaab from these central regions and protecting northern areas from retaliatory attacks.

From March to April of 2023, the final push of the first phase would eliminate Al-Shabaab's dominating presence in these central regions. The victories in this period would not be decisive, and continued action in the area to prevent Al-Shabaab from re-embedding themselves in these areas would continue until August. As a consequence of this victory in the Hirshabelle State, Al-Shabaab operatives would move over the border into Kenya and continue conducting activity there. Other operatives, moved further south to the Lower Shabelle Regions. These areas have long been under the occupation of Al-Shabaab. The second phase, which officially began in August of 2023, planned on targeting the last remnants of Al-Shabaab in these southern areas. These areas are critical to Al-Shabaab's operations and would be vehemently protected by them. As a result, the violence and severity of the attacks doubled as Somalia entered its second stage of the counter-offensive.

Phase Two

Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from March to April [The Start of Phase Two]

Somalia targeted the areas of Lower Shabelle and Galgaduud where it had a strong presence of local fighters, sympathetic to the Government's cause. Al-Shabaab also had members from the same local clan, which they had negotiated with months prior. The clan in question, the Hawiye Clan is the largest in Somalia and was experiencing its own turmoil. A political disagreement split the group, and sub-clans who desired the protection of Sharia Law sided with Al-Shabaab. Those who remained in the clan pledged their allegiances to the Somali government. On August 25th, this second phase would begin with the Somali military capturing the occupied town of Ceel Buur, the last remaining Al-Shabaab stronghold in the Galmudug region. Just as quickly as they had occupied the town, they evacuated it, fearing a strong terrorist retaliation. The town was immediately recaptured by terrorist forces. Giving Al-Shabaab such a tactical advantage allowed them to recapture key areas that were taken in the first phase of the counter-offensive. A large portion of the forces on both sides were made up of local clans and militias.

The losses in Galmudug and the reliance on clans caused a political outcry from many in Somalia. The Government had recently requested more support from their African allies and the additional support was coming slowly. They argued that local clans were the only way they could keep fighting Al-Shabaab. As for the US, they were still assisting in the counter-offensive but had now shifted their focus from ground assaults to targeting key members of the terrorist organization's financial hierarchy. Politicians were now actively speaking out against the territorial losses and poor planning of the campaign, including the county's President Ahmed Mohamed Islam. Many blamed the leader of Somalia's military for the tactical blunders made in the counter-offensive. As the second phase faltered, more political discourse continued and military action halted. Politicians began to claim that local clans were not invested in the fight against Al-Shabaab and shouldn't be part of the counter-offensive at all. During September, political in-fighting by the state government in Galmudug would see little progress being made on the offensive front. In fact, the political infighting allowed Al-Shabaab to refortify and retake multiple key locations.

As the year comes to a close, fighting remains focused around Ceel Buur and Ceel Dheer, locations that were once under the Somalian Government's control but were vacated after the military retreat. With Al-Shabaab able to strengthen their position it remains a point of contentious fighting. The most successful Somali advances were made in the Middle Juba Region. As the year comes to a close, it seems the second phase has not been as successful as the first. With military activities coming to a halt and fighting becoming deadlocked, the Somali government is at an impasse. Al-Shabaab is struggling, not with fighting but with in-fighting between leadership. The US' plan to eliminate high-ranking members of the group has been incredibly successful with financial chiefs and group leaders being killed by airstrikes. Ambitious terror operatives are now fighting for control of these positions within the group.

Map of Al-Shabaab Internal Clashes

In October, in-fighting between Al-Shbaab peaked, especially in the hotly contested region of Middle Juba. There have been four reported fights attributed to Al-Shabaab in that month alone. Before 2023, there has only ever been one reported. Diriye is the current leader of the Al-Shabaab organisation, which he assumed in 2014 after his predecessor was killed by a US airstrike. His leadership was surprising to many as it was expected that prominent member Mahad Warsame would take control of the group. Warsame was given the role of Deputy. In 2022 Diriye fell into bad health and was expected to die. Upon his death, Warsame would assume control of the group. Diriye's health issues weren't as bad as first thought and he survived. His survival seemingly tore apart the group with Warsame and Diriye clashing over multiple issues. The crackdown on the group's financial wing also wounded the group significantly. It was expected that Al-Shabaab would bring in tens of millions of dollars every year, but with the seizure of over 200 bank accounts, funds for the group were restricted. Warsame's multiple attempts to undermine Diriye's power resulted in fighters loyal to the group's leader clashing with his men. In response to this repeated undermining of his leadership, Dirye announced that he would pass leadership to another prominent member of the group, not Warsame.

Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from August to September [During Phase Two]

Summary

The counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab has reached its peak and its valleys this year. From a coordinated counter-insurgency initiative to a failing military offensive plagued by political infighting. Despite this, the African Union hopes to exit the country by 2024, leaving the country secure enough for Somalia's military to handle. Though the counter-offensive lost momentum in September and October, the deteriorating state of Al-Shabaab's leadership and infrastructure offers a unique opportunity for them to capitalize on. It will be interesting to see if politicians and clan disputes can be put aside to tackle the common enemy or if political differences will continue to hinder the offensive. With Al-Shbaab's leadership fractured and the group turning on itself, it is the ideal time for the military to act.

Tags: Somalia counter-terrorism, Al-Shabaab updates, Horn of Africa conflict, African Union intervention, Terrorism in Somalia, Military offensive 2023, Al-Shabaab leadership, Political infighting in Somalia, African military cooperation, Terrorist group dynamics, Security situation in Somalia, Anti-terrorism efforts, Al-Shabaab insurgency, International military support, Somali government strategy, Military successes and setbacks, Al-Shabaab financial crackdown, Political discourse in Somalia, Counter-insurgency developments, Somalia security updates 2023

Follow The Money: Crowdfunding, Terrorism & Charity

Crowdfunding is something that has become globally known over the past decade. With discussions surrounding crowdfunding come the stories of its misuse. Whether people lie to receive donations or those who e-beg on social media, crowdfunding has its fair share of controversies. It is not only fraudsters who exploit these services but also terror organisations. Crowdfunding websites allow terrorists to act in plain sight, masquerading behind or sometimes as charitable organisations to receive funds. This issue reaches beyond the crowdfunding space. The economic exemptions and rules for non-profits allow them to become a target for money laundering. These tactics from terror organisations prey on ordinary people who believe they are giving to charity, but are, in fact, contributing to terror activity.

How does Crowdfunding contribute to Terrorism?

The way in which crowdfunding websites are set up allows for terrorism to use the site with ease. This makes these donation websites the most susceptible to being exploited by terrorist organisations. These illicit organisations purposefully seek out websites that have major flaws so they can act more productively. Many crowdfunding sites have dubious and vague conditions which do not explicitly disallow terror-inciting content. They also target websites that allow owners to keep funds, even though their monetary goal was not met. The method of payment is important to these extremists. Some websites make it so donators remain anonymous, hiding their identity behind a username or allowing anonymous donating. Crowdfunding sites that allow crypto and donations through dubious financial institutions are also ideal to terrorists. These payment methods obscure the identity of the donators and of the campaign runners, allowing them to act without any attention from the authorities. Terrorists also look for similar terror incitement campaigns on the website. If they find evidence of other terror organisations operating on the website then they are reassured that they too can operate unimpeded. The details of the actual campaign are also crucial to spotting those established by terrorist organisations. The biggest indicator is a lack of or unclear background information about the campaign. Their names can be broad, generic terms. For example, 'save the children, or 'helping refugees in conflict zones'. They purposefully make these campaigns look charitable as sympathetic ideas to attract donations from more people. This also makes it possible for unsuspecting people to make donations. The same campaign being posted across numerous crowdfunding sites and offering a variety of payment methods are also a red flag for terrorist activity. Sometimes, these campaigns will offer donation links in the actual descriptions, allowing for the website's payment method to be bypassed completely. This not only means that payments won't be recorded on the website, but also allows donators to further obscure their identity.

Often, terrorist campaigns are easy to spot. The descriptions will discuss political issues in a hateful rhetoric or be openly supportive of terrorism. Usually, their goals will be far larger than similar campaigns in its category and have much more support. Another easy way is to check the legitimacy of associated charities. Sometimes, campaigns will mention another non-profit to bolster their legitimacy. In reality, these charities are usually not associated with the campaign in any way or are also controlled by terror organisations. Checking the legitimacy or contacting listed charities are the best way to find their legitimacy. Often times, a simple Google search will turn up reports of terror-linked charities. This is the same with the campaign's creator. Often times, the creator is also linked to terrorism in some way. The day the campaign is posted may also hold some significance to the terrorist organisation. Checking the day of a campaign's posting may also reveal a link to terrorism.

Donors to these campaigns can vary quite significantly. Most of the time, terrorists coordinate with pre-established donors, who direct their funds to the desired campaign. Sometimes, it can be from unwitting donors who just want to direct their money towards a charity, unknowingly supporting terrorist activity. Donors are the biggest asterisk in identifying criminal crowdfunding campaigns. All because a donator has links to terrorism or financial crime, doesn't mean that all of the campaigns they contribute to are affiliated. It is common for donators who do contribute to terror run campaigns to spread their funds across various legitimate campaigns to cover their tracks. This way authorities can't easily see which campaign is run by terrorists. When examining a campaign's donators there are certain telltale signs that show authorities that they are contributing to terrorists. Things like: abnormally large donation amounts, use of cryptocurrency to donate and if the donators have donated to other terrorist run campaigns. It can also be the case that these donators aren't real and are instead bot accounts created by a single donator. This is done to spread large donations across several smaller transactions, as to not raise the eyebrows of the authorities. Admins can usually detect these fake accounts as they share the same IP address or bank account as the other accounts.

To summarise, crowdfunding websites are vulnerable to terrorist campaigns. When looking to donate to an unverified campaign, there are several things authorities and donators can do to see if it is run by terror organisations: 

• Avoid crowdfunding sites without proper verification or bad terms of service. 
• Check if the campaign's goals are similar to other campaigns in its category. 
• Check the description of the campaign to see if the aims of the campaign are specific. 
• See if the date it was posted aligns with any significant terror events. 
• Research the donator's background. See if their accounts are legitimate and what other campaigns they have pledged to. 

Social Media's Role in Funding Terrorism

Social media's role in recruiting terrorists is well known, but what isn't is how it transformed the way in which terrorism is funded. The widespread use of social media allows for terrorist groups to send messages and cryptocurrency without impediment, especially through encrypted services like Telegram. The two biggest users of social media to bolster their funding is ISIS and Al-Qaeda. These websites allow terrorist run accounts to pool resources and in conjunction with cryptocurrency, allows them to do so nearly anonymously. Social media has regulation but maintaining the online space is extremely costly. Websites like Facebook and Twitter rely on user-submitted reports to monitor the site. This rather lacklustre approach to moderations allows for terrorists to remain active. The anonymous, unregulated nature of cryptocurrency allows these unmonitored accounts to now move funds, as well.

Many of the most popular social media sites have a documented history of allowing or unknowingly fostering communities of terrorists. During the 2010s, it was found that Facebook had not banned several ISIS-affiliated accounts who were using the site for recruitment and funding purposes. Even though these accounts violated their terms of services, they did not ban them. Furthermore, the maintaining of these pro-terror communities creates an echo chamber for such activity. It not only promotes but strengthens support among terror operatives. Furthermore, these groups can establish and coordinate fraudulent non-profit accounts to support their efforts.

The Non-Profit Issue in Serbia

Serbia is a country that has faced the most prominent issues with terrorists using non-profits to fund their operations. Serbia is the ideal place for terrorists to do this for a number of reasons. Their non-profit financial laws are not as strong as other European nations. Serbia is a cash-reliant country, where 30% of the county's transactions are done in cash. Registration laws and checks for charities in the country are also extremely lax, allowing for organizations to establish themselves as non-profit without submitting the proper documentation. Many religious non-profits are exempt from having to submit such documentation, allowing for religious terrorists to infiltrate the sector easily. Serbia has no financial agency dedicated to overseeing the non-profit sector. They only have the conventional police and tax authorities, who are already burdened with other financial enforcement work. Other European nations have regulatory bodies that focus purely on non-profits. This lack of a central non-profit regulator also means that it is harder for these authorities to properly investigate fraudulent charities, as there is no central place to find documentation. When checks are done to new non-profits, they are so loose that they're essentially meaningless. There is no strategy in place for differing authorities to communicate with one another about such issues.

The SBRA is the closest institution Serbia has to a non-profit regulatory body. However, the SBRA performs terribly. They keep little information and fail to do proper background checks. Key data, including the founder of the charity and where they operate, has mostly been lost. In a study, done by the European Union, it was found that there were 58 non-profit organizations active in Serbia and in other locations overseas. There was no documentation, aims, goals, or financial documentation from these 58 organizations. Almost nothing is known about these organizations. These failings make it incredibly easy for terrorists to infiltrate the sector.

Such little documentation and disregard of the rules make it incredibly easy for terrorists to abuse non-profits in Serbia. Of those 58 organizations active overseas, none have their other country listed. They could be active in high-risk areas, such as Syria, Somalia, or Afghanistan, where they could be actively funding terror groups. Thankfully, the European Union has been working closely with Serbia to improve their financial security laws. Even with basic data and documentation checks in place, terrorists will take a massive hit, as their exploitation of non-profits will be evident. The establishment of financial regulatory foundations will be invaluable to countering financial crime in Serbia.

Tags: Financial crime, Money laundering, Fraud prevention, Anti-money laundering (AML), Cybercrime, Financial fraud, Identity theft, White-collar crime, Compliance regulations, Risk management, Fraud detection, Regulatory compliance, Financial security, Insider trading, Banking fraud, Ponzi scheme, Corruption, Cybersecurity, Know Your Customer (KYC),Suspicious activity