A Year in Counter Terrorism: The Counter-Offensive Against Al-Shabaab in Somalia
2023 has been a monumental year in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. For nearly two decades, the Somali Government has been fighting the terror group Al-Shabaab. This year, a second phase of a joint counter-offensive against the group was carried out. African Union, US, Somali, and other African nation troops came together to strike back against Al-Shabaab. This year has seen two phases of the counter-offensive, the first dealing with Al-Shabaab in the central regions of the country and the second seeing allied militaries push into the heartlands of Al-Shabaab-controlled territory.
Phase One
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| Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from August 2022 [The Start of Phase One] |
Phase One of this counter-offensive began in August of 2022. This opening phase consisted of consolidating military power in northern regions and pushing Al-Shabaab out of the country's central regions. In these opening months, the Somali Government began to rally the support of local clans and militias active in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Previously, these clans and local forces were left out of military activity. The failings of the Somali Government in the past had radically changed their views on these local forces. It was apparent that without these local clans' support, successfully defeating Al-Shabaab would not have been possible. The Government also found key targets in Central Somalia to focus their attacks on. In particular, numerous Al-Shabaab strongholds in central Somalia were the main targets of this first phase.
As the nation entered 2023, the dimensions of the first phase had transformed radically. Political tensions within Somalia had ruptured ties to some of the local clans. An incident involving tax collection issues with some of these local clans caused them to no longer cooperate with Somalia's Government. This hampered this first phase enormously, as Al-Shabaab sought to negotiate with these local clans, to stop their resistance against them. The negotiations between the local fighters and Al-Shabaab occurred in the key areas of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The lack of local clan support in these key areas, caused Somalia to turn to their international allies to aid them in continuing the counter-offensive.
These key allies would be instrumental in continuing, and eventually, ending this first phase successfully. Several neighbouring African nations have their own forces fighting Al-Shabaab, independent of the African Union. Many of these neighbouring countries have forces pledged to the African Union as well. African Union troops were instrumental in carrying out raids on towns in these central regions. The US would also be instrumental in aiding the Somali Government. Particularly, the Air Force would prove incredibly useful in eliminating key members of Al-Shabaab. Somalia's own military and security forces were also key in eliminating Al-Shabaab from these central regions and protecting northern areas from retaliatory attacks.
From March to April of 2023, the final push of the first phase would eliminate Al-Shabaab's dominating presence in these central regions. The victories in this period would not be decisive, and continued action in the area to prevent Al-Shabaab from re-embedding themselves in these areas would continue until August. As a consequence of this victory in the Hirshabelle State, Al-Shabaab operatives would move over the border into Kenya and continue conducting activity there. Other operatives, moved further south to the Lower Shabelle Regions. These areas have long been under the occupation of Al-Shabaab. The second phase, which officially began in August of 2023, planned on targeting the last remnants of Al-Shabaab in these southern areas. These areas are critical to Al-Shabaab's operations and would be vehemently protected by them. As a result, the violence and severity of the attacks doubled as Somalia entered its second stage of the counter-offensive.
Phase Two
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| Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from March to April [The Start of Phase Two] |
Somalia targeted the areas of Lower Shabelle and Galgaduud where it had a strong presence of local fighters, sympathetic to the Government's cause. Al-Shabaab also had members from the same local clan, which they had negotiated with months prior. The clan in question, the Hawiye Clan is the largest in Somalia and was experiencing its own turmoil. A political disagreement split the group, and sub-clans who desired the protection of Sharia Law sided with Al-Shabaab. Those who remained in the clan pledged their allegiances to the Somali government. On August 25th, this second phase would begin with the Somali military capturing the occupied town of Ceel Buur, the last remaining Al-Shabaab stronghold in the Galmudug region. Just as quickly as they had occupied the town, they evacuated it, fearing a strong terrorist retaliation. The town was immediately recaptured by terrorist forces. Giving Al-Shabaab such a tactical advantage allowed them to recapture key areas that were taken in the first phase of the counter-offensive. A large portion of the forces on both sides were made up of local clans and militias.
The losses in Galmudug and the reliance on clans caused a political outcry from many in Somalia. The Government had recently requested more support from their African allies and the additional support was coming slowly. They argued that local clans were the only way they could keep fighting Al-Shabaab. As for the US, they were still assisting in the counter-offensive but had now shifted their focus from ground assaults to targeting key members of the terrorist organization's financial hierarchy. Politicians were now actively speaking out against the territorial losses and poor planning of the campaign, including the county's President Ahmed Mohamed Islam. Many blamed the leader of Somalia's military for the tactical blunders made in the counter-offensive. As the second phase faltered, more political discourse continued and military action halted. Politicians began to claim that local clans were not invested in the fight against Al-Shabaab and shouldn't be part of the counter-offensive at all. During September, political in-fighting by the state government in Galmudug would see little progress being made on the offensive front. In fact, the political infighting allowed Al-Shabaab to refortify and retake multiple key locations.
As the year comes to a close, fighting remains focused around Ceel Buur and Ceel Dheer, locations that were once under the Somalian Government's control but were vacated after the military retreat. With Al-Shabaab able to strengthen their position it remains a point of contentious fighting. The most successful Somali advances were made in the Middle Juba Region. As the year comes to a close, it seems the second phase has not been as successful as the first. With military activities coming to a halt and fighting becoming deadlocked, the Somali government is at an impasse. Al-Shabaab is struggling, not with fighting but with in-fighting between leadership. The US' plan to eliminate high-ranking members of the group has been incredibly successful with financial chiefs and group leaders being killed by airstrikes. Ambitious terror operatives are now fighting for control of these positions within the group.
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| Map of Al-Shabaab Internal Clashes |
In October, in-fighting between Al-Shbaab peaked, especially in the hotly contested region of Middle Juba. There have been four reported fights attributed to Al-Shabaab in that month alone. Before 2023, there has only ever been one reported. Diriye is the current leader of the Al-Shabaab organisation, which he assumed in 2014 after his predecessor was killed by a US airstrike. His leadership was surprising to many as it was expected that prominent member Mahad Warsame would take control of the group. Warsame was given the role of Deputy. In 2022 Diriye fell into bad health and was expected to die. Upon his death, Warsame would assume control of the group. Diriye's health issues weren't as bad as first thought and he survived. His survival seemingly tore apart the group with Warsame and Diriye clashing over multiple issues. The crackdown on the group's financial wing also wounded the group significantly. It was expected that Al-Shabaab would bring in tens of millions of dollars every year, but with the seizure of over 200 bank accounts, funds for the group were restricted. Warsame's multiple attempts to undermine Diriye's power resulted in fighters loyal to the group's leader clashing with his men. In response to this repeated undermining of his leadership, Dirye announced that he would pass leadership to another prominent member of the group, not Warsame.
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| Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from August to September [During Phase Two] |
Summary
The counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab has reached its peak and its valleys this year. From a coordinated counter-insurgency initiative to a failing military offensive plagued by political infighting. Despite this, the African Union hopes to exit the country by 2024, leaving the country secure enough for Somalia's military to handle. Though the counter-offensive lost momentum in September and October, the deteriorating state of Al-Shabaab's leadership and infrastructure offers a unique opportunity for them to capitalize on. It will be interesting to see if politicians and clan disputes can be put aside to tackle the common enemy or if political differences will continue to hinder the offensive. With Al-Shbaab's leadership fractured and the group turning on itself, it is the ideal time for the military to act.
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