This is why Hizb ut-Tahrir have been added to the UK's Terror List (Hizb ut-Tahrir Explained)

UK Home Secretary James Cleverly after banning the group

The UK is at the forefront of Western counter-terror initiatives. Their recent participation in the US-led anti-Houthi coalition seemingly prompted the Home Office to reevaluate the position of Islamic fundamentalist groups operating within the UK. One group, in particular, has been targeted by the UK Home Office: Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, the British arm of the Lebanese-based Hizb ut-Tahrir. So, who is Hizb ut-Tahrir, and why are they being placed on the UK's list of banned terror groups?

Who is Hizb ut-Tahrir?

Founded in 1953 by Palestinian scholar, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation championed the idea of a singular, unified Muslim state. This idea of forming a Muslim caliphate is an idea championed by other Islamic extremist organisations, like the Islamic State. To them, it was the Muslim world against all other religions and beliefs. The group was also founded on the idea that jihad was a fundamental and important aspect of Islam. The group is fundamentally opposed to Zionism and the state of Israel. Such beliefs meant that the group was involved in numerous assaults and failed coups in the Middle East, with the group being linked to failed coups in Jordan and Syria. All the while, the organisation claimed to be one of non-violence. In 1989, this illusion would finally be dropped, when the organisation began to move away from their non-violent approaches and instead become more militant in their efforts to form a Muslim caliphate. Since then, the group has endorsed suicide bombing and other forms of violence against national governments. In 2003, two events would push Hazb ut-Tahrir to its most violent position yet: the US-led invasion of Iraq and the retirement of the group's then-leader Abdul Qadeem Zallum. He was replaced by a Palestinian, Ata Khalil Abu-Rashta, an advocate for Hizb ut-Tahrir to become more extreme in their actions and instructions to their supporters. When the US invaded Iraq, the group became galvanised to fight back against Western intervention in the Middle East. The group would also be extremely involved in the Syrian Revolution, and the following conflicts, hoping that the revolutionary soldiers could platform Hizb ut-Tahrir's beliefs about forming an Islamic Caliphate.

Beyond its involvement in crises, Hizb ut-Tahrir has utilized emerging forms of communication, like the Internet, to spread its extreme platform worldwide. With branches in fifty countries, including the UK, its estimated membership ranges from ten thousand to millions. The group's finances and logistics remain mysterious, with speculations about funding from members' contributions or possibly from national governments like Iran or Saudi Arabia.
The group's extreme beliefs, particularly in endorsing violence against countries seen as a danger to Muslims, have led several nations, including China, Brazil, Bangladesh, Germany, and Muslim nations except the UAE, Lebanon, and Yemen, to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir. With a history riddled with calls to violence, it is no surprise that the group has been banned in the UK. However, the actual process of getting it banned in the British Isles has been a long and complicated one.

Why were they added to the terror group list by the UK Government?

Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters at a Pro-Palestine Protest

The group was first put under scrutiny in 2005 when Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to ban the group after the London Bombings. Subsequent investigations found that the group had no links to the terror attacks. In 2010, UK Prime Minister David Cameron promised to ban the group. This was easier said than done. When approached about banning the organisation, UK lawyers claimed that they couldn't add the group to the list of banned organisations as they had not committed any terror-related offences. Discussions of banning the group would not return to the UK political consciousness until October of 2023. The current conflict between Israel and Palestine had ushered Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain to organise Pro-Palestinian protests. At these protests, members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were chanting for jihad which caused great concern among police and politicians. Following the protests, Hizb ut-Tahrir took to their websites to support Hamas attacks on Israel and attacks on Jewish people in other countries. Promoting and encouraging such violence prompted Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper to call for the group to be banned. She spoke about the group in the House of Commons in a speech that got the attention of many UK politicians. Days later, Home Secretary James Cleverly began the process of getting the group banned. On January 19th, British politicians agreed that the British wing of Hizb ut-Tahrir should be added to the list of banned terror organisations. In one final statement, the leaders of the UK branch of the group stated that the ban was politically motivated and that they had no credible links to actual terror organisations.

For more articles like this, check out our page. For additional articles about counter-terrorism, click here! 

For an article about their involvement in Operation Prosperity Guardian, click here!

 A Year in Counter Terrorism: The Coups of Africa

The past few years have seen multiple crises in the continent of Africa, not only through the rise in violent extremism but also through political unrest. The coups in Africa have been some of the most reported incidents in Africa this year. Niger and Gabon saw coups this year, making it seven coups in Africa since 2020. Often referred to as the 'coup belt', the worrying trend in Western and Central African coups reveals a worrying trend in African Democracy. The circumstances behind the Nigerien and Gabonese coups reveal the problems with Democracy in these African nations. 

The Nigerien Coup Crisis

The coup in Niger is a showcase of the wider problems in West Africa. To understand why President Mohamed Bazoum was removed from power, it is important to understand the issues surrounding violent extremism in the region. Extremism and insurgency in West Africa are rife. Terrorist organizations and their activities affect the democratic processes both nationally and internationally. Pressures applied to governments by these groups have led to widespread disdain for national governments and their failures when it comes to tackling extremism. This is one reason why coups in West Africa are an extremely common occurrence. Military juntas currently control Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Guinea, and Chad. An overthrow of the government is detrimental to the international relations of the country. For many of these coup-affected governments, the ousted leader was friendly with Western countries, usually the former colonial owner of the nation. Once removed, new allies would be found with enemies of those in the West. In West Africa, this mainly consists of the juntas distancing themselves from France and strengthening relations with Russia, and by extension, the Wagner paramilitary Group.

The Wagner Group has created a new incentive for this relationship with Russia. In the fight against terror in these affected African nations, usually, Western allies would be aiding in the fight against extremism. As these counter-terror activities failed, blame quickly fell onto the Western militaries, from both the country's citizens, politicians, and military. Once a coup had taken place, western allies and International Organisations (like the African Union) would sever all support. This would leave a massive military vacuum as hundreds of troops would be removed from the fight against counter-terror. Strengthening relations with Russia enables these military juntas to use the paramilitary Wagner Group, which already has a strong presence in Africa. Such a dynamic has created a sort of incentive for the military to take control of the government. 

Fighting extremism in Africa has been fraught with tactical and political disasters. So, when public and military support had shifted against the sitting government, militaries didn't have to worry about the implications of a potential coup. Once they had assumed power, they would have a firm ally in Russia. International organisations also impose sanctions on military juntas to deter them from happening. However, the mass of military juntas in Africa means that there is now a support system in place for these new juntas. No longer will financial sanctions devastate the country, because other juntas will assist new ones. This process, and the growing number of juntas in Africa, creates a worrying backdrop to the Nigerien Coup Crisis.

In the early months of 2023, Niger was experiencing a security crisis, facing two insurgencies by two different warring terrorist organizations. JNIM, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgent group, and the Islamic State in the Sahel are both active in Niger and actively fighting against each other. Furthermore, rebel organizations in the neighbouring juntas and criminal bandit gangs are also active around Niger's border. With all of these groups active, vying for control of border areas of Niger, violent attacks are extremely common, not just on other groups but also on politicians and civilians. Niger's military, along with supporting French soldiers, were struggling to properly combat the violence. The background of violence bred a rise in anti-government sentiment and negative attitudes towards France. President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger had been a vocal supporter of France and had criticized his junta neighbours on numerous occasions. He had spoken negatively about the coups of neighbouring Mali and their decisions to employ the Wagner Group. He had criticized Burkina Faso for employing local militias in counter-terrorism. These statements, while endorsing France, galvanized his detractors and even attracted critics from these neighbouring nations.

The growing dislike for the sitting government put pressure on politicians to make changes within the military, in hopes of correcting the issues of the failed counter-terror campaigns. President Mohamed Bazoum had started making plans to remove military leadership from their roles. One of these leaders about to be fired from their position was Abdourahamane Tchiani, the leader of the Presidential Guard. Tchiani had held the position for many years and had defended Bazoum and his predecessor from coup attempts. The decision to remove him had him, and many other military leaders, feeling scorned by Bazoum and his government.

On July 26th, Tchiani, and the Presidential Guardsmen began the coup. Reports came out saying that the Guardsmen were conducting anti-republican activities. Then, it was reported that Bazoum and his family were now hostages within their home. Coup-supporting forces, from other branches of the county's military, began to block off key Governmental buildings and began dispersing crowds of Bazoum's supporters with gunfire. Forces loyal to Bazoum, mainly members of the Army and National Guard, began to take key strategic points, preparing to engage any pro-coup forces on the move. The scene was set for country-wide warfare between government loyalists and pro-coup forces. 

The Chief of the country's air force, and other prominent members from various armed forces branches, took to television to declare his support for the coup and told the general public that Bazoum had been ousted from power. He also formally announced the formation of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (NCSH), Niger's new military junta Government. The military had made their coup obvious and clear, but many believed that Bazoum still held power. He had not resigned or commented on the coup against him. Western nations began to criticise the coup and called for the release of Bazoum.

Nigerien Military Officials on TV Backing the Coup Against Bazoum

Before widespread violence could break between Government loyalists and pro-coup forces, the Chief of Staff for the Nigerien Army signed a document endorsing the coup, to avoid the brutal country-wide fighting. The junta began using their new authoritative powers to suspend all military cooperation with France. The junta also had officials on TV making announcements. Such public displays and immediate action against France had stirred up the critics of Bazoum and France. Thousands took to the streets brandishing Russian flags and vandalising government buildings. Police attempted to disperse the crowds, but a riot quickly broke out with government buildings being set alight. All forms of demonstration were then banned by the Interior Ministry. On July 28th, the Government was officially suspended and General Tchiani was declared as the new head of state. In a statement, delivered on television, Tchiani scorned Bazoum for his lack of cooperation with neighbouring juntas and his unwavering support for France. This was the end of the coup, but not from the crisis. Bazoum and his family had been imprisoned in his home and were not being freed.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is an international organisation that covers the area of West Africa. Previously, they had imposed restrictions on military juntas. Seeing the growing trend of coups in West Africa, and the lack of impact from their sanctions, ECOWAS took immediate, decisive action after Niger's coup. Financial sanctions weren't a feasible punishment due to the fostering of military juntas. ECOWAS demanded Bazoum be reinstated by July 30th. When this was not done, they began to discuss mobilising their standing, armed force to physically reinstate him. In early August, the force was raised and plans were made to invade Niger. The junta threatened to kill Bazoum if ECOWAS did so. Since then, there has been a tentative negotiation process between ECOWAS, the junta and the United Nations, all the while Bazoum remains imprisoned. 

To read the initial reactions and analyses as the Nigerien Coup unfolded, check out our first article reporting on it: https://visionmilitarynews.blogspot.com/2023/07/the-ongoing-coup-in-niger-what-we-know.html

Here is another article on the Pro-Russian Movement sweeping through Niger: https://visionmilitarynews.blogspot.com/2023/08/the-post-coup-pro-russian-movement.html

The Coup in Gabon 

The coup in Gabon has one man at the centre of it: President, now former President, Ali Bongo Ondimba. Unlike the other coups in West Africa, Gabon's coup was not prompted by the reaction to violent extremism. In fact, Gabon was a relatively secure country security-wise. Instead, Gabon's coup was caused by internal corruption within the nation's Government. The Bongo family had a vice-like grip on the democratic processes of Gabon since its independence in 1960. Bongo had held office since 2009 when his father passed away, with leadership being passed to him after his death. Since then, his reign has been marred in controversy.

Gabon's Former President Ali Bongo

Gabon is a member of OPEC, an organisation where the world's most petroleum-rich nations cooperate to influence global oil markets. The main goal of this group is to boost revenue for member nations, with other members including Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Mexico. Despite being part of this organisation and being one of Africa's largest oil producers, Gabon's population remains poverty-stricken. Unemployment rates for 15 to 24-year-olds were around 40%, and one-third of the country lived in poverty. The income from Gabon's massive oil exports wasn't reinvested in the country but was absorbed by Bongo and his corrupt Government.

The issue of corruption didn't just plague Gabon's economy but also its elections. Following his re-election in 2016, tensions boiled over in an attempted coup. Bongo was elected with 95.5% of the overall votes, with 99.9% of the county's population voting. These numbers were highly suspect and were met with immediate scepticism from Bongo's detractors. In 2019, a coup was attempted to remove Bongo from power following his years of corruption. This coup failed, and Bongo vowed to keep Gabon stable, unlike other regions in Africa.

The corruption and scandal by Ali Bongo continued, and by 2020, the country had found itself in an economic crisis. In August 2023, Bongo was up for re-election once again, and it was expected that he would lose due to his immense unpopularity. However, once again, he was re-elected in dubious circumstances on August 26th, 2023. His opponent in the elections, and the candidate who had placed second, Albert Ondo Ossa, began to put pressure on Bongo about the election results, believing they had tampered with. When it came time to officially reveal the election results, it was done in the middle of the night, unannounced on state television. Then, curfew measures and internet restrictions were imposed to curb the criticism about the results. Bongo and his Government claimed that the talks of corruption were fake news by those attempting to incite violence. Bongo's re-election was officially announced at 3:30 in the morning by Gabon's Electoral Commission, with him winning with 64% of the overall vote. The early morning announcement did not stop the citizens of Gabon from protesting. Immediately protests began against President Ali Bongo and his corrupt Government. Gabon's military intervened, siding against Bongo. Military officials took to TV Channel Gabon24 to declare that they were removing Bongo from power. One military official said that Bongo was being ousted because of "irresponsible, unpredictable governance," which led to "a continuous degradation of social cohesion." They also announced a border closure and a curfew whilst they removed Bongo from power.

Excerpt from the statement read by the military official: "Our beautiful country, Gabon, has always been a haven of peace. Today, the country is going through a serious institutional, political, economic, and social crisis [...] We are therefore forced to admit that the organisation of the general elections of 26 August 2023 did not meet the conditions for a transparent, credible, and inclusive ballot so much hoped for by the people of Gabon. [...] Added to this is irresponsible and unpredictable governance, resulting in a continuing deterioration in social cohesion, with the risk of leading the country into chaos […] People of Gabon, we are finally on the road to happiness. May God and the spirits of our ancestors bless Gabon. Honour and loyalty to our homeland.”

Bongo, his family and a few close advisors were arrested at his home in Libreville. Some gunshots were heard as crowds were deterred from breaking into the former president's mansion. Inside the house, the Bongo family were unharmed by military personnel. They were all arrested for their involvement in fraudulent government procedures and placed under immediate house arrest. Suitcases full of Central African Francs were also recovered which may have been stashed campaign funds by the Bongo family. Whilst under house arrest, Ali Bongo took to social media to call for his supporters to protest his removal and to reinstate him as President of Gabon. Following this video post, the Bongo Family had their phones confiscated. Those arrested were:

• Ali Bongo [Former President]- Detained 
• Noureddin Bongo Valentin [President Bongo's Oldest Son & Advisor]- Detained
• Sylvia Valentin [Wife of President Bongo]- Charged with Money Laundering, Receiving Stolen Goods, Forgery and Fraud
• Richard Auguste Onouviet [President of the National Assembley]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Ian Ghislian Ngoulou [Presidential Chief of Staff]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Mohamed Ali Saliou [Deputy Chief of Staff]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Jessye Ella Ekogha [Presidential Spokesperson]- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Unnamed Presidential Advisor- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking
• Two Officials in Bongo's Affiliated Party, the Gabonese Democratic Party- Charged with High Treason, Misappropriation of Public Funds, Organised International Financial Embezzlement, Forgery, Falsification of the President's Signature, Active Corruption and Drug Trafficking

The military appointed Brigadier General Brice Oligui as the new interim president of Gabon whilst they sought to form a transitional government. Oligui was the leader of the Republican Guard, Gabon's security force and Presidential guard. Oligui is no stranger to politics, with him being a close advisor to Ali Bongo's father Omar Bongo. He was met with celebration, being carried through the streets by Gabonese citizens upon his appointment. In an interview with a French publication, Oligui spoke about the discontentment felt by the Gabonese people and that he would lead the new Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions, a committee that would create an established, functioning Government. He said that reconstructing these institutions would be done quickly, but proper due diligence would be taken to avoid the pitfalls of corruption. He also stated that Bongo was officially retired from politics.

Gabonese citizens celebrating the removal of Bongo

In the weeks after Bongo's removal, the country returned to normality with borders being reopened, internet services restored to normal and curfews being phased out. In the months following Oligui has stuck to his promise and has slowly begun building up a transitional government cabinet. In November, he announced that elections for a new President would be held in August 2025. As for Bongo, he was released from confinement and allowed to leave the country. It was revealed that the former President was suffering from major health complications and that he needed to leave the country to seek treatment. Bongo received treatment abroad and returned to his residence in Libreville where he now lives.

The Coup in Gabon highlights the previous failings of African Democracies. Whereby a corrupt group of individuals could deprive an entire nation of its wealth. Greed, corruption and power had blinded Bongo, forcing him to commit illegal acts to stay in power. His ousting was celebrated widely in Gabon and it remains unclear if he will stand trial for his alleged crimes.

To read the initial reactions and analyses as the Gabonese Coup unfolded, check out our first article reporting on it: https://visionmilitarynews.blogspot.com/2023/08/the-ongoing-unrest-coup-in-gabon.html

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What is Operation Prosperity Guardian? (The Red Sea Crisis & US strikes in Yemen)

In the sphere of counterterrorism, it has already been a monumental year in 2024. A coalition of forces, led by the US, has launched several attacks on Houthi positions in Yemen. The ongoing operation, called Operation Prosperity Guardian, is a military response to the unfolding Red Sea Crisis. In this article, the goals and aims of the operation will be examined, as well as the crisis that prompted the coalition to form.

The Red Sea Crisis

The Red Sea and Suez Canal are arguably the most important shipping routes in the world. Recent events have forced global trade to use the Suez Canal over other routes, especially for trade between Asia, Europe, and the US. The Suez Canal is faster than circumnavigating the continent of Africa around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds an extra two weeks to sea voyages. Recent droughts in Panama have hindered the capabilities of the Panama Canal, forcing traders to use the Suez Canal. However, the Suez Canal is in a geopolitical hotbed of unrest, notably Yemen, a country whose coast sits on the Red Sea.

Yemen has been facing unrest from the Houthi Movement since the 1980s. The Houthis formed out of staunch opposition to Saudi Arabia's influence over Yemen and were galvanized by the US Invasion of Iraq in the early 1990s. The group is staunchly against western powers and their Asian allies interfering in Middle Eastern matters. The Houthi Movement comprises nearly 20,000 fighters who have been carrying out attacks across Yemen, gaining control of a western section of the country.

The Houthis divide Muslim nations, with some, like Iran and Qatar, financially backing the group in its efforts to overthrow the Yemeni Government. On the other hand, countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been supporting the national Yemeni Government in their fight against the movement. The Houthis have been more proactive in their attacks since the conflict between Israel and Palestine broke out, targeting container ships in the Red Sea. Their most notable attack was on a cargo ship named the Galaxy Leader, which was seized and taken back to a Houthi-controlled port in Yemen, disrupting global trade significantly.

The economic impact of the Crisis has already been seen, with businesses turning to aircraft for shipping due to fears of cargo being jeopardized in the Suez Canal. Some fear that if the crisis goes unanswered, shipping companies may increase their fees, leading to higher prices for goods worldwide. However, leading financial experts believe that a major escalation in Houthi attacks would be required to seriously harm shipping companies to the point where it affects the prices of everyday items.

Operation Prosperity Guardian

UK Typhoon Jets launching strikes against the Houthis

Fearing further escalation, the US formed a coalition of nations to curb Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. On December 18th, the US announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, consisting of the US, UK, Norway, Greece, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Australia, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Bahrain, which will be the host nation for the military operation. There are a number of other aiding nations, though they have chosen not to be named as members of the US Coalition.

In the days after it was signed, on the 31st, the US began to carry out military activity in the Red Sea, with helicopters firing upon small boats attempting to capture a container ship. Ten militants were killed, and Operation Prosperity Guardian had officially begun. Soon, coalition nations began to send naval fleets to the Red Sea to begin their protection efforts. The UK's HMS Richmond and HMS Lancaster are traveling to the Suez as this article is being written. The US has already deployed the aircraft carrier the Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Suez, along with three destroyer-class ships, the USS Gravely, USS Laboon, and USS Mason. On January 9th, US and British navy and aircraft shot down 21 drones and missiles launched at them by the Houthis in Yemen, marking the largest attempted attack by the Houthis in the region. UK officials said that further escalation from the Houthis will only prompt more western nations to join the coalition.

In the Middle East, Prosperity Guardian has been met with mixed results. Many from Yemen are thankful for the protection as it is not only safeguarding global trade routes but also stemming the growth of the Houthi Movement. Officials in Yemen feared that if the Houthis gained significant control over the Red Sea, it would only further their efforts against them. However, Saudi Arabia has not been as happy about the operation's success. They have been attempting to normalize relations with Iran, and it is believed a peace deal might be reached on the condition that Saudi Arabia recognizes the Houthi Movement as a legitimate one. Such recognition could allow the Houthis to be acknowledged on the same level as the Yemeni National Government. Saudi Arabia has been fighting the Houthis since the group's inception and leads a coalition of Middle Eastern nations against the group. These negotiations with Iran could put this Operation in jeopardy. With widespread official recognition, plans to attack the Houthis could become increasingly complicated and fraught with international pressure to stop. Attacks by the Houthis have been condemned by the nations and organizations that support them.

What does this mean for the future of Yemen?

In the realm of counter-terrorism, the future of Yemen hangs in the balance. Several factors will contribute to the success and failure of Operation Prosperity Guardian. The Saudi negotiations with Iran will have a major contributing factor to whether the strike against the Houthis will be condemned by US allies in the Middle East. Furthermore, there are already rumours that US officials are displeased with the UK's immediate, and possibly unplanned, counter-attacks against Houthi forces. The situation has already unfolded rapidly in the past month, so it is likely that more developments in this story will occur in the coming weeks.

To read more about the Yemeni Civil War and its impacts around the world, check out another article here - which looks at how Qatar used US lobbyists to infiltrate Donald Trump's cabinets.

A Year in Counter Terrorism: The Counter-Offensive Against Al-Shabaab in Somalia

2023 has been a monumental year in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. For nearly two decades, the Somali Government has been fighting the terror group Al-Shabaab. This year, a second phase of a joint counter-offensive against the group was carried out. African Union, US, Somali, and other African nation troops came together to strike back against Al-Shabaab. This year has seen two phases of the counter-offensive, the first dealing with Al-Shabaab in the central regions of the country and the second seeing allied militaries push into the heartlands of Al-Shabaab-controlled territory.

Phase One

Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from August 2022 [The Start of Phase One]

Phase One of this counter-offensive began in August of 2022. This opening phase consisted of consolidating military power in northern regions and pushing Al-Shabaab out of the country's central regions. In these opening months, the Somali Government began to rally the support of local clans and militias active in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Previously, these clans and local forces were left out of military activity. The failings of the Somali Government in the past had radically changed their views on these local forces. It was apparent that without these local clans' support, successfully defeating Al-Shabaab would not have been possible. The Government also found key targets in Central Somalia to focus their attacks on. In particular, numerous Al-Shabaab strongholds in central Somalia were the main targets of this first phase.

As the nation entered 2023, the dimensions of the first phase had transformed radically. Political tensions within Somalia had ruptured ties to some of the local clans. An incident involving tax collection issues with some of these local clans caused them to no longer cooperate with Somalia's Government. This hampered this first phase enormously, as Al-Shabaab sought to negotiate with these local clans, to stop their resistance against them. The negotiations between the local fighters and Al-Shabaab occurred in the key areas of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The lack of local clan support in these key areas, caused Somalia to turn to their international allies to aid them in continuing the counter-offensive.

These key allies would be instrumental in continuing, and eventually, ending this first phase successfully. Several neighbouring African nations have their own forces fighting Al-Shabaab, independent of the African Union. Many of these neighbouring countries have forces pledged to the African Union as well. African Union troops were instrumental in carrying out raids on towns in these central regions. The US would also be instrumental in aiding the Somali Government. Particularly, the Air Force would prove incredibly useful in eliminating key members of Al-Shabaab. Somalia's own military and security forces were also key in eliminating Al-Shabaab from these central regions and protecting northern areas from retaliatory attacks.

From March to April of 2023, the final push of the first phase would eliminate Al-Shabaab's dominating presence in these central regions. The victories in this period would not be decisive, and continued action in the area to prevent Al-Shabaab from re-embedding themselves in these areas would continue until August. As a consequence of this victory in the Hirshabelle State, Al-Shabaab operatives would move over the border into Kenya and continue conducting activity there. Other operatives, moved further south to the Lower Shabelle Regions. These areas have long been under the occupation of Al-Shabaab. The second phase, which officially began in August of 2023, planned on targeting the last remnants of Al-Shabaab in these southern areas. These areas are critical to Al-Shabaab's operations and would be vehemently protected by them. As a result, the violence and severity of the attacks doubled as Somalia entered its second stage of the counter-offensive.

Phase Two

Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from March to April [The Start of Phase Two]

Somalia targeted the areas of Lower Shabelle and Galgaduud where it had a strong presence of local fighters, sympathetic to the Government's cause. Al-Shabaab also had members from the same local clan, which they had negotiated with months prior. The clan in question, the Hawiye Clan is the largest in Somalia and was experiencing its own turmoil. A political disagreement split the group, and sub-clans who desired the protection of Sharia Law sided with Al-Shabaab. Those who remained in the clan pledged their allegiances to the Somali government. On August 25th, this second phase would begin with the Somali military capturing the occupied town of Ceel Buur, the last remaining Al-Shabaab stronghold in the Galmudug region. Just as quickly as they had occupied the town, they evacuated it, fearing a strong terrorist retaliation. The town was immediately recaptured by terrorist forces. Giving Al-Shabaab such a tactical advantage allowed them to recapture key areas that were taken in the first phase of the counter-offensive. A large portion of the forces on both sides were made up of local clans and militias.

The losses in Galmudug and the reliance on clans caused a political outcry from many in Somalia. The Government had recently requested more support from their African allies and the additional support was coming slowly. They argued that local clans were the only way they could keep fighting Al-Shabaab. As for the US, they were still assisting in the counter-offensive but had now shifted their focus from ground assaults to targeting key members of the terrorist organization's financial hierarchy. Politicians were now actively speaking out against the territorial losses and poor planning of the campaign, including the county's President Ahmed Mohamed Islam. Many blamed the leader of Somalia's military for the tactical blunders made in the counter-offensive. As the second phase faltered, more political discourse continued and military action halted. Politicians began to claim that local clans were not invested in the fight against Al-Shabaab and shouldn't be part of the counter-offensive at all. During September, political in-fighting by the state government in Galmudug would see little progress being made on the offensive front. In fact, the political infighting allowed Al-Shabaab to refortify and retake multiple key locations.

As the year comes to a close, fighting remains focused around Ceel Buur and Ceel Dheer, locations that were once under the Somalian Government's control but were vacated after the military retreat. With Al-Shabaab able to strengthen their position it remains a point of contentious fighting. The most successful Somali advances were made in the Middle Juba Region. As the year comes to a close, it seems the second phase has not been as successful as the first. With military activities coming to a halt and fighting becoming deadlocked, the Somali government is at an impasse. Al-Shabaab is struggling, not with fighting but with in-fighting between leadership. The US' plan to eliminate high-ranking members of the group has been incredibly successful with financial chiefs and group leaders being killed by airstrikes. Ambitious terror operatives are now fighting for control of these positions within the group.

Map of Al-Shabaab Internal Clashes

In October, in-fighting between Al-Shbaab peaked, especially in the hotly contested region of Middle Juba. There have been four reported fights attributed to Al-Shabaab in that month alone. Before 2023, there has only ever been one reported. Diriye is the current leader of the Al-Shabaab organisation, which he assumed in 2014 after his predecessor was killed by a US airstrike. His leadership was surprising to many as it was expected that prominent member Mahad Warsame would take control of the group. Warsame was given the role of Deputy. In 2022 Diriye fell into bad health and was expected to die. Upon his death, Warsame would assume control of the group. Diriye's health issues weren't as bad as first thought and he survived. His survival seemingly tore apart the group with Warsame and Diriye clashing over multiple issues. The crackdown on the group's financial wing also wounded the group significantly. It was expected that Al-Shabaab would bring in tens of millions of dollars every year, but with the seizure of over 200 bank accounts, funds for the group were restricted. Warsame's multiple attempts to undermine Diriye's power resulted in fighters loyal to the group's leader clashing with his men. In response to this repeated undermining of his leadership, Dirye announced that he would pass leadership to another prominent member of the group, not Warsame.

Map of Clashes with Al-Shabaab from August to September [During Phase Two]

Summary

The counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab has reached its peak and its valleys this year. From a coordinated counter-insurgency initiative to a failing military offensive plagued by political infighting. Despite this, the African Union hopes to exit the country by 2024, leaving the country secure enough for Somalia's military to handle. Though the counter-offensive lost momentum in September and October, the deteriorating state of Al-Shabaab's leadership and infrastructure offers a unique opportunity for them to capitalize on. It will be interesting to see if politicians and clan disputes can be put aside to tackle the common enemy or if political differences will continue to hinder the offensive. With Al-Shbaab's leadership fractured and the group turning on itself, it is the ideal time for the military to act.

Tags: Somalia counter-terrorism, Al-Shabaab updates, Horn of Africa conflict, African Union intervention, Terrorism in Somalia, Military offensive 2023, Al-Shabaab leadership, Political infighting in Somalia, African military cooperation, Terrorist group dynamics, Security situation in Somalia, Anti-terrorism efforts, Al-Shabaab insurgency, International military support, Somali government strategy, Military successes and setbacks, Al-Shabaab financial crackdown, Political discourse in Somalia, Counter-insurgency developments, Somalia security updates 2023

Follow The Money: Crowdfunding, Terrorism & Charity

Crowdfunding is something that has become globally known over the past decade. With discussions surrounding crowdfunding come the stories of its misuse. Whether people lie to receive donations or those who e-beg on social media, crowdfunding has its fair share of controversies. It is not only fraudsters who exploit these services but also terror organisations. Crowdfunding websites allow terrorists to act in plain sight, masquerading behind or sometimes as charitable organisations to receive funds. This issue reaches beyond the crowdfunding space. The economic exemptions and rules for non-profits allow them to become a target for money laundering. These tactics from terror organisations prey on ordinary people who believe they are giving to charity, but are, in fact, contributing to terror activity.

How does Crowdfunding contribute to Terrorism?

The way in which crowdfunding websites are set up allows for terrorism to use the site with ease. This makes these donation websites the most susceptible to being exploited by terrorist organisations. These illicit organisations purposefully seek out websites that have major flaws so they can act more productively. Many crowdfunding sites have dubious and vague conditions which do not explicitly disallow terror-inciting content. They also target websites that allow owners to keep funds, even though their monetary goal was not met. The method of payment is important to these extremists. Some websites make it so donators remain anonymous, hiding their identity behind a username or allowing anonymous donating. Crowdfunding sites that allow crypto and donations through dubious financial institutions are also ideal to terrorists. These payment methods obscure the identity of the donators and of the campaign runners, allowing them to act without any attention from the authorities. Terrorists also look for similar terror incitement campaigns on the website. If they find evidence of other terror organisations operating on the website then they are reassured that they too can operate unimpeded. The details of the actual campaign are also crucial to spotting those established by terrorist organisations. The biggest indicator is a lack of or unclear background information about the campaign. Their names can be broad, generic terms. For example, 'save the children, or 'helping refugees in conflict zones'. They purposefully make these campaigns look charitable as sympathetic ideas to attract donations from more people. This also makes it possible for unsuspecting people to make donations. The same campaign being posted across numerous crowdfunding sites and offering a variety of payment methods are also a red flag for terrorist activity. Sometimes, these campaigns will offer donation links in the actual descriptions, allowing for the website's payment method to be bypassed completely. This not only means that payments won't be recorded on the website, but also allows donators to further obscure their identity.

Often, terrorist campaigns are easy to spot. The descriptions will discuss political issues in a hateful rhetoric or be openly supportive of terrorism. Usually, their goals will be far larger than similar campaigns in its category and have much more support. Another easy way is to check the legitimacy of associated charities. Sometimes, campaigns will mention another non-profit to bolster their legitimacy. In reality, these charities are usually not associated with the campaign in any way or are also controlled by terror organisations. Checking the legitimacy or contacting listed charities are the best way to find their legitimacy. Often times, a simple Google search will turn up reports of terror-linked charities. This is the same with the campaign's creator. Often times, the creator is also linked to terrorism in some way. The day the campaign is posted may also hold some significance to the terrorist organisation. Checking the day of a campaign's posting may also reveal a link to terrorism.

Donors to these campaigns can vary quite significantly. Most of the time, terrorists coordinate with pre-established donors, who direct their funds to the desired campaign. Sometimes, it can be from unwitting donors who just want to direct their money towards a charity, unknowingly supporting terrorist activity. Donors are the biggest asterisk in identifying criminal crowdfunding campaigns. All because a donator has links to terrorism or financial crime, doesn't mean that all of the campaigns they contribute to are affiliated. It is common for donators who do contribute to terror run campaigns to spread their funds across various legitimate campaigns to cover their tracks. This way authorities can't easily see which campaign is run by terrorists. When examining a campaign's donators there are certain telltale signs that show authorities that they are contributing to terrorists. Things like: abnormally large donation amounts, use of cryptocurrency to donate and if the donators have donated to other terrorist run campaigns. It can also be the case that these donators aren't real and are instead bot accounts created by a single donator. This is done to spread large donations across several smaller transactions, as to not raise the eyebrows of the authorities. Admins can usually detect these fake accounts as they share the same IP address or bank account as the other accounts.

To summarise, crowdfunding websites are vulnerable to terrorist campaigns. When looking to donate to an unverified campaign, there are several things authorities and donators can do to see if it is run by terror organisations: 

• Avoid crowdfunding sites without proper verification or bad terms of service. 
• Check if the campaign's goals are similar to other campaigns in its category. 
• Check the description of the campaign to see if the aims of the campaign are specific. 
• See if the date it was posted aligns with any significant terror events. 
• Research the donator's background. See if their accounts are legitimate and what other campaigns they have pledged to. 

Social Media's Role in Funding Terrorism

Social media's role in recruiting terrorists is well known, but what isn't is how it transformed the way in which terrorism is funded. The widespread use of social media allows for terrorist groups to send messages and cryptocurrency without impediment, especially through encrypted services like Telegram. The two biggest users of social media to bolster their funding is ISIS and Al-Qaeda. These websites allow terrorist run accounts to pool resources and in conjunction with cryptocurrency, allows them to do so nearly anonymously. Social media has regulation but maintaining the online space is extremely costly. Websites like Facebook and Twitter rely on user-submitted reports to monitor the site. This rather lacklustre approach to moderations allows for terrorists to remain active. The anonymous, unregulated nature of cryptocurrency allows these unmonitored accounts to now move funds, as well.

Many of the most popular social media sites have a documented history of allowing or unknowingly fostering communities of terrorists. During the 2010s, it was found that Facebook had not banned several ISIS-affiliated accounts who were using the site for recruitment and funding purposes. Even though these accounts violated their terms of services, they did not ban them. Furthermore, the maintaining of these pro-terror communities creates an echo chamber for such activity. It not only promotes but strengthens support among terror operatives. Furthermore, these groups can establish and coordinate fraudulent non-profit accounts to support their efforts.

The Non-Profit Issue in Serbia

Serbia is a country that has faced the most prominent issues with terrorists using non-profits to fund their operations. Serbia is the ideal place for terrorists to do this for a number of reasons. Their non-profit financial laws are not as strong as other European nations. Serbia is a cash-reliant country, where 30% of the county's transactions are done in cash. Registration laws and checks for charities in the country are also extremely lax, allowing for organizations to establish themselves as non-profit without submitting the proper documentation. Many religious non-profits are exempt from having to submit such documentation, allowing for religious terrorists to infiltrate the sector easily. Serbia has no financial agency dedicated to overseeing the non-profit sector. They only have the conventional police and tax authorities, who are already burdened with other financial enforcement work. Other European nations have regulatory bodies that focus purely on non-profits. This lack of a central non-profit regulator also means that it is harder for these authorities to properly investigate fraudulent charities, as there is no central place to find documentation. When checks are done to new non-profits, they are so loose that they're essentially meaningless. There is no strategy in place for differing authorities to communicate with one another about such issues.

The SBRA is the closest institution Serbia has to a non-profit regulatory body. However, the SBRA performs terribly. They keep little information and fail to do proper background checks. Key data, including the founder of the charity and where they operate, has mostly been lost. In a study, done by the European Union, it was found that there were 58 non-profit organizations active in Serbia and in other locations overseas. There was no documentation, aims, goals, or financial documentation from these 58 organizations. Almost nothing is known about these organizations. These failings make it incredibly easy for terrorists to infiltrate the sector.

Such little documentation and disregard of the rules make it incredibly easy for terrorists to abuse non-profits in Serbia. Of those 58 organizations active overseas, none have their other country listed. They could be active in high-risk areas, such as Syria, Somalia, or Afghanistan, where they could be actively funding terror groups. Thankfully, the European Union has been working closely with Serbia to improve their financial security laws. Even with basic data and documentation checks in place, terrorists will take a massive hit, as their exploitation of non-profits will be evident. The establishment of financial regulatory foundations will be invaluable to countering financial crime in Serbia.

Tags: Financial crime, Money laundering, Fraud prevention, Anti-money laundering (AML), Cybercrime, Financial fraud, Identity theft, White-collar crime, Compliance regulations, Risk management, Fraud detection, Regulatory compliance, Financial security, Insider trading, Banking fraud, Ponzi scheme, Corruption, Cybersecurity, Know Your Customer (KYC),Suspicious activity